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The purpose of this study is to advance understanding of the probable intentions of the
current Soviet leadership in their initiatives for peace, cooperation, and disarmament.
This study concludes that, rather than embodying new political thinking that might
evoke well- founded hope in the West for genuine peace and stability, Soviet initiatives
reflect a long-term Soviet orientation toward unilateral strategic advantage. The West
should therefore respond to these initiatives with caution and vigilance. The primary
methodology of this study is qualitative content analysis of key expressions of Soviet
policy by authoritative spokesmen. Two areas of background to contemporary Soviet
peace programs, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1973-75, and
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The current General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. M.S.
Gorbachev, in the closing paragraph of his book, Perestroika , wrote,
We want freedom to reign supreme in the coming century everywhere in the world.
We want peaceful competition between different social systems to develop unim-
peded, to encourage mutually advantageous cooperation rather than confrontation
and an arms race. We want people of every country to enjoy prosperity, welfare and
happiness. The road to this lies through proceeding to a nuclear-free, non-violent
world. We have embarked on this road, and call on other countries and nations to
follow suit. [Ref. 1: p. 254]
By themselves, these words emanate hope for a better tommorow. Is there more mean-
ing contained in this paragraph than is at first apparent? Does the best and brightest
hope for the future really lie in the international designs of the CPSU alluded to here?
The answer to these questions should begin with an understanding of the context in
which Gorbachev's statements are presented. Two sides of this context are evident. The
first is linguistic, and the second is the background of the audience. On the linguistic
side, Soviet expressions of a peaceful and conciliatory nature have been clarified in the
past by an examination of their background. Consider this example offered by Stanley
Kober. It involves Lenin's statement that "Disarmament is the ideal of socialism." This
statement was quoted by Andrei Gromyko in a major speech in 1983, and by Constanin
Chernenko in a 1985 letter to a Canadian student published in Kommunist. Both men
cited this quotation by Lenin to underscore the peaceful and nonthreatening intentions
of the Soviet Union. The seemingly nonthreatening and "confidence-building" ring of
Lenin's words is dispelled by the context in which Lenin framed them.
Disarmament is the ideal of socialism. There will be no wars in socialist society:
consequently, disarmament will be achieved. But whoever expects that socialism
will be achieved without a social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat is
not a socialist. Dictatorship is state power based on violence. And in the twentieth
century -- as in the age of civilization generally - violence means neither a fist nor
a club, but troops. To put "disarmament" in the program is tantamount to making
the general declaration: We are opposed to the use of arms. There is as little
Marxism in this as there would be if we were to say: We are opposed to violence!
[Ref. 2: p. 198]
More will be said later about the theme of disarmament in key Soviet statements,
and about General Secretary Gorbachev's interpretations of Lenin and the history of the
Soviet period. The point here is the necessity lor Western audiences to be attentive to
the context of Soviet statements of conciliation and peace.
A second element of the context of Soviet statements is the medium of understand-
ing with which they are expected to be received in the West. This involves the back-
ground of the listener. In order for Western listeners to understand the intent of the
Soviet proposals which are directed to them, these prospective targets need to gain in-
sight regarding how the Soviets frame these appeals.
Gorbachev, in the opening paragraphs of Perestroika, says
In writing this book, it has been my desire to address directly the peoples of the
USSR, the United States, indeed every country.
I have met government and other leaders of many states and representatives of
their public, but the purpose of this book is to talk without intermediaries to the
citizens of the whole world about things that, without exception, concern us all.
I have written this book because I believe in their common sense. I am con-
vinced that they, like me, worry about the future of our planet. This is the most
important matter. [Ref. 1: p. 9]
In these paragraphs, the General Secretary makes a public announcement of his plans
for a new world order, some details of which he outlined in the book's concluding para-
graph cited earlier. How the Soviets gauge the receptivity of Western audiences to these
appeals for peace therefore constitutes a most important second element of the context
in which the appeals are framed.
B. HYPOTHESIS
Far from embodying new political thinking that might evoke well-founded hope in
the West for genuine peace and stability, current Soviet initiatives for "peace, cooper-
ation, and disarmament" reflect a long-term Soviet orientation toward unilateral strate-
gic advantage; the West should therefore respond to these initiatives with vigilance and
caution.
C. PLAN FOR EXPLORING HYPOTHESIS
The primary methodology of this study is qualitative content analysis o[ key ex-
pressions of Soviet policy by authoritative spokesmen. Two areas of background to
contemporary Soviet peace programs, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe. 1973-75, and Soviet commentary on U.S. nuclear freeze movement, in 1980-84,
arc examined as well.
D. ANALYTICAL ASSUMPTIONS
The reader should be aware of the assumptions that have influenced this study:
1. The Soviet Union has engaged the West in a long-term competition and seeks
unilateral strategic advantage.
2. This struggle is carried on by the Soviets on every level available to them: military,
diplomatic, informational, espionage and so forth.
3. The Soviet concept of the correlation of forces is valuable in that it illustrates how
the Soviets see this spectrum of strategic efforts as an organic whole.
4. Soviet initiatives and communications are assumed to be carefully phrased political
statements.
5. The General Secretary is seen as a spokesman for the collective leadership of the
Politburo.
6. The General Secretary speaks to two audiences. The first is the CPSU and the
second is the external target audience.
7. Soviet messages for Western target audiences are not meaningless. This assump-
tion requires the following qualifications: the first being that the true meaning of-
ten lies beneath the surface and the second that the Soviet leadership's true intent
is frequently misunderstood, since Western publics are generally uninformed about
the Soviet Union's ideological foundations and modes of communication. The
Soviets are aware of this widespread lack of knowledge in Western societies, and
expect Western audiences to interpret Soviet statements within Western frame-
works of understanding.
H. THE CSCE - ORIGINS TO THE FINAL ACT
A. INTRODUCTION
The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (signed
August 1, 1975 by 35 countries, including the United States and Canada) is not a treaty.
It is not a legally binding instrument. It is a statement of political will made by the na-
tions that signed it. As such, the wording of the Final Act, the negotiations that brought
it into being, and the political interpretations of its content are rich areas in which to
gain insight regarding the nature of the struggle between the two main systems repres-
ented at the conference -- the democracies of the West and the totalitarian regimes of
the East.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the CSCE Final Act in the light of the
protracted political and military competition between West and East. To this end, eight
themes are examined:
1. Background and chronology of the CSCE
2. Negotiating characteristics of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
3. Language and word choice
4. Analysis of the text of the Final Act
5. Political will
6. Detente and disarmament
7. Human rights
8. Conclusions
This chapter is focused on the Final Act — on its content, its development and its sub-
sequent use in political statements. This scope is intentionally narrow and exclusive of
the continuing history of the followup conferences that have been held since 1975. Ad-
ditionally, the writer recognizes that the simplification of the CSCE dialogue to an
East-West struggle entails a degree of distortion, because it does not assess the role that
the neutral and nonaligned participants played in the conference.
B. BACKGROUND AND CHRONOLOGY
The 35 signatures subscribed to the Final Act were penned by ten presidents, sev-
enteen prime ministers, four first secretaries of communist parties, two foreign ministers
and two personal representatives of heads of state. The large number of signators and
the varieties of their titles testify to the grand scale and political diversity represented at
the nearly two years of continuous negotiations that produced the Final .Act.
Milestones on the long road to the CSCE began with the Warsaw Pact's Bucharest
Declaration of 1965 that called for a European conference to settle issues of recognition
of borders and normalization of relations between states that had been unresolved since
the end of World War II. 1 This call lor a European conference was repeated in L969 in
the form of the "Budapest Appeal" that focused on conditions for recognition of the
partition of Germany. Later that same year the NATO ministers' meeting in Washinton
issued a reply which made the participation of the U.S. and Canada in any "all
European" talks a precondition for such a conference. On April 5. 1969, Finland offered
to host both the preparatory talks and the conference. During the remainder of 1969
refinement of the scope and preconditions for the conference continued to be worked
out between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).
During 1970 several major steps toward the conference were taken. The first was
an exchange of ministerial communiques between NATO (May) and the WTO (June).
NATO suggested a two part agenda for the conference that covered the principles gov-
erning relations between states, and freer exchanges and cooperation between states.
The WTO accepted both the participation of the U.S. and Canada and the Alliance's
broadening of the agenda. This exchange witnessed the conception of the twin themes
of the conference that would provide so much contention in the womb of deliberations
and eventually provide both blocs with the ability to claim political victory after the
Final Act was signed.
A second breakthrough in 1970 was the signing of the FRG-USSR and FRG-Poland
treaties of renunciation of force. These treaties were early trophies of the Ostpolitik of
the FRG's Chancellor, Willy Brandt. The 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin
(signed by the Soviets after the Bundestag approved it in the spring of 1972) symbolized
the removal of the final impediment to convening the conference.
Multilateral preparatory talks began in Helsinki on November 22, 1972 and were
completed on June 8, 1973. These preparatory talks produced a document, "Final Rec-
ommendations of the Helsinki Consultations," which outlined the organization, agenda
and procedural rules that were followed during deliberations. Most notable among these
procedural rules was that of consensus which it defined as.
Decisions of the Conference shall be taken by consensus. Consensus shall be un-
derstood to mean the absence of objection expressed by a Representative and. sub-
1 This chronology was drawn from John Marcsca's eyewitness account and analysis of the
CSCE contained in Reference 3.
mitted bv him as constituting an obstacle to the takins of the decision in question.
[Ref. 3: p. 221]
This rule of consensus was a great equalizer for the smaller states as it gave them an
equal voice with the larger states in the negotiations.
After these preparatory talks, three phases of the CSCE followed. Phase I. con-
ducted on the ministerial level, met between the third and seventh of July, 1973 and July
21. 1975 in Geneva, Switzerland. Phase II, held July 30th and August 1st, 1975 in
Helsinki, ended the conference with the signing of the Final Act. Plans for followup
meetings were written into the Final Act. Additionally, various Experts' Meetings were
planned on specific topics.
This skeleton chronology reveals several points that are key to understanding the
nature and context of the CSCE. One of these points is that the conference was a
Warsaw Pact initiative of the 1960s (with roots in the 1950's and earlier) that was
eventually embraced by NATO in the 1970's. The bipolar nature of the origins of the
conference should not be lost in the egalitarian character of the deliberations that were
guided by the principle of consensus.
C U.S. AND SOVIET NEGOTIATING CHARACTERISTICS
This section will not give a detailed chronological description of the negotiations
that took place during Phase II of the CSCE. Additionally, since a later section of this
chapter will address the Final Act itself and give an overview of its content, a description
of the results of the negotiations here would be premature. Instead, this section will
focus on several distinctive features of the styles of the U.S. and Soviet teams, the
chamption states of the two negotiating blocs.
1. U.S. Negotiating Style
The initial U.S. posture at the conference was relaxed and supportive of its alli-
ance partners. The U.S. had concluded major bilateral agreements with the U.S.S.R.
prior to the conference on nearly every' area of cooperation and security that would
eventually be included in the Final Act [Rcf. 4: p. 245]. The spirit of the day was detente
when the negotiations began. The conference offered the Nixon administration an op-
portunity to enhance American prestige abroad while it disentangled the nation from the
war in Vietnam. Believing that it had little at risk, the U.S. administration was free to
play a supporting actor role to its European alliance partners' lead. This relaxed nego-
tiating stvle would stiffen into a more resistant and less conciliatorv one as the confer-
ence proceeded, in response to domestic political pressures [Ref 3: p. 46]. These pressures
will be described later in this chapter.
2. Soviet Negotiating Style
it does the Soviet delegation no slight to describe their style as resembling the
techniques of psychological warfare. A sampling of two of the twenty Soviet negotiating
techniques described by John Maresca supports this evaluation.
Hinting at hard liners back in Moscow. Occasionally, the Soviets would at-
tempt to persuade Western delegates to accept a position because doing so would
strengthen the hands of those in the Kremlin who favored detente in their dealings
with Moscow hawks. This reasoning was, of course, advanced only in private con-
tacts and on a "personal" basis, but it was nevertheless effective at times, especially
with Western delegates who fancied themselves Sovietologists or who liked to think
they were having an effect on the internal Soviet power struggle.
Intimidation. The Soviets also used a variety of personal pressures to ad-
vance their own ideas. They commonly sought to intimidate individual Western
delegates who took vigorous positions the Soviets disliked. Intimidation was carried
out through public ridicule, heaping abuse on a delegate or on his position in an
open meeting, or usually in more private circumstances, by a sometimes unnerving
display of anger, complete with threats to ruin the delegate's career. In some in-
stances, the Soviets actually did complain about individual Western delegates to
their sponsoring governments, something to which most career diplomats are ex-
tremely sensitive, even though complaints from the Soviets should in most cases be
regarded as compliments. [Ref. 3: pp. 61-62]
One of the greatest values of the CSCE experience may be the lessons it has to
offer as a case study in negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Soviets entered the
negotiations with a strength of purpose built up over the long years they worked for the
conference. They came to Geneva with a detailed draft proposal that included broadly
worded principles such as.
. . .sovereign equality, non-resort to the threat or use of force, inviolability of bor-
ders, territorial integrity, peaceful settlements of disputes, non-interference in do-
mestic affairs, respect for human rights and the basic freedoms, equality and the
right of peoples to decide their own future, cooperation between states, honest ful-
fillment of obligations under international law. [Ref. 5: p. 14]
Apparently there was something precious to the Soviets locked inside language of that
type, for they fought a hard light to preserve its integrity. Before leaving this topic,
consider Maresca's advice for future diplomats involved in negotiations with the Soviets.
The CSCE experience showed once again that the Soviets are deeply prudent
negotiators. Their overriding priorities are defensive - not to lose anything they
already have, whether it be territory, military superiority, or tactical advantage . . .
They are sharp traders and never give away something for nothing. Their bureauc-
racy permits no idle whims, personal idiosyncrasies, independent actions, or informal
probes. Faced with such an adversary, our negotiators must be at least as well or-
ganized, as disciplined, and as patient as the Russians. If we are as firm at summit
meetings as our negotiators are when they are bound by specific insructions, the
Soviets will have to deal with our positions; if we are not. the Soviets will understand
that our negotiating positions are meaningless. [Ref. 3: p. 63]
D. LANGUAGE AND WORD CHOICE
Problems of translaton and word choice are traditional factors of international ne-
gotiations and diplomacy. Lawyers, translators and multilingual diplomats all had key
roles in the CSCE negotiations. Out of these talks emerged many curious instances that
underscored the problems posed by language in international events. Four are described
here.
The first curiosity is that the conference was conducted in no less than six official
languages - English. Russian. French, German, Spanish and Italian.
The second curiosity is the unusual role that the German language played at the
conference. It was spoken by five nations that participated in the conference: FRG.
GDR, Austria, Switzerland and Liechtenstein. This five nation group carried on parallel
consultations during the conference on wording of sections of the Final Act as they
neared completion. The results of this linguistic cooperation between German speaking
NATO, WTO and neutral states served to enhance the value and the authority of the
German text of the Final Act. [Ref. 3: p. 22]
The third curiosity was the Soviet delegation's use of the translation problem to
their advantage. Russian is an intricate language that is not studied in the West as much
as it should be. given the prominence of the Soviet Union on the world scene. When it
was to the Soviet delegation's advantage to do so, it took the position that "No one re-
ally understands Russian except a native speaker." Impasse points like this were usually
breached only when Western delegations brought native speakers of Russian to bear on
the problem. [Ref. 3: p. 61]
A fourth curiosity was the shade of meaning and implications of critical word
choices. One example was the verb tense ambiguity generated in a section of the Final
Act regarding the legitimacy of territorial acquisitions. Here the Soviet delegation ac-
cepted wording which seemed to be contrary to their implied agenda of international
recognition of their gains made in World War II. Harold Russel. principal negotiator
lor the Basket One negotiations, describes this apparent oversight by saying.
The U.S.S.R. accepted this formulation because it mistakenly concluded that this
language could only be read prospectively as applying to future occupations and
acquisitions of territory in the first sentence, in that the style of all the principles,
uses the future tense. [Ref. 4: p. 265]
Such is the level of attention to language demanded in international negotiations.
The Conference formally recorded its concern for the problems of language and
translation in European affairs by resolving in Part Four of Basket Three to encourage
language education.
E. ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL ACT
The choice of a. final act as the legal instrument to record the results of the CSCE
was made because of its uniquely nonbinding nature. The broad scope of the issues to
be discussed was recognized from the outset, and a broad, general instrument was cho-
sen. The legal nature of a final act fit this context the best. [Ref. 4: p. 246]
Two important principles were established early in the negotiations. The first was
that the CSCE Final Act would be subordinated to the principles guiding relations be-
tween states embodied in Article 103 of the U.N. Charter [Ref. 4: p. 263]. This decision
established the relationship between the CSCE and the worldwide international forum
of the U.N. The second principle was that the obligation of signatory states to abide
by the provisions of the Final Act would be nonbinding, and follow "recognized princi-
ples of international law. "2 On one hand these ambiguous qualifiers may be seen as
limiting the value of the Final Act. On the other hand, it is doubtful that any other
course could have been taken. The CSCE Final Act was not a peace treaty that was
imposed on a defeated nation. It was more of a "memorandum of understanding" be-
tween 35 nations that conferred as co-equals.
The topics considered during Phase II of the CSCE were grouped into three general
categories called "baskets." The first basket contained topics involving security and
confidence in Europe. The second basket contained topics concerned with cooperation
in the fields of economics, science, technology and the environment. Basket three con-
tained topics concerned with cooperation in humanitarian areas.
The "beginning and the end" of the document contain revealing insights regarding
the significance of the Final Act. Consider the statement of resolve and intent in the
general preamble to the document (the last three paragraphs of the preamble).
Motivated by the political will, in the interest of peoples, to improve and inten-
sify their relations and to contribute in Europe to peace, security, justice and coop-
2 Principle Ten of Basket One Section One of the CSCE Final Act. The text used in this study
was reprinted in Department of Stale Bulletin and is listed as Reference 6.
eration as well as to rapprochement among themselves and with the other States of
the world.
Determined, in consequence, to give full effect to the results of the conference
and to assure, among their States and throughout Europe, the benefits deriving from
those results and thus to broaden, deepen, and make continuing and lusting the
process of detente.
The High Representatives of the participating States have solemnlv adopted the
following: [Ref. 6: p. 323]








Two of these themes -- political will and detente - will be treated in depth in later
sections of this chapter.
The last sentence of the general preamble refers to the signators as the "High Rep-
resentatives" of their states. As mentioned earlier, the secretaries of ruling communist
parties were included among those signators. This fact brings up a noteworthy technical
point -- that in the context of traditional international law, the head of a communist
party is not a head of state. One West German jurist, writing in the American Journal
of International Law stated,
Therefore, in sociological and political terms, the East European Communist parties
are in law more like insurgent movements than like traditional political parties of the
Western type. They are de facto sovereign in their respective states. [Ref. 7: p. 322]
A Soviet ideologist would probably label this legal analysis as "bourgeois formalism."
In contrast to this Western viewpoint, consider this short excerpt from Brezhnev's
speech at Helsinki on the eve of his signing the Final Act.
The special political importance and moral force of the agreements reached at the
conference lie in the fact that they are to be certified by signatures of the top leaders
of the participating states. To make these agreements effective is our common, most
important objective.
We proceed from the assumption that all of the countries represented at the
conference will translate into life the agreements reached. As regards the Soviet
L'nion it will act precisely in this manner. [Ref. 8: p. 94]
By referring to himself as the top leader of his state, Brezhnev invited a comparison
with other leaders that says something about the nature of Soviet political power. The
li)
Soviet General Secretary is not a head of state in the classic sense. He is not a dynastic
ruler related to other rulers by blood and custom. He is not the spokesman of a popular
mandate from his countrymen. He is the leader of a party that has thoroughly invested
a state, the chief of a self-perpetuating oligarchy, legitimized by the claims of an ideol-
ogy. (It should be noted that, while Brezhnev later became the U.S.S.R.'s formal head
of state in 1977 - Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet -- his position in
1975, at the time he signed the Helsinki Final Act, was simply that of General Secretary
of the CPSU.) Considering the second paragraph of the above quotation, it is well to
remember that the Soviet state is not bound by self-restraint to be consistent in word
and action.
As mentioned earlier, the Final Act was not intended to be a legally binding treaty
or charter. Setting conjectures on hidden intentions by negotiating blocs aside, the text
itself reveals an agenda of hope and idealism. Three ideals that emerge from the text are:
detente, cooperation and confidence.
The word detente occurs in the text seven times, always in terms of hope to expand
or extend or make lasting the process of detente. For reasons of evidence far beyond a
textual analysis of the Final Act, detente appears to be the key concept of the CSCE.
As such, it will be treated in its own section of this chapter.
The term cooperation is part of the title of the conference and occurs in nearly every
article of the Final Act.
Confidence was linked to security in the text. Presumably this confidence, this belief
or faith in another, was to be applied to one's opposites in the other camp, and that
security was to emerge from confidence that one's opponents had renounced aggression.
In these three terms, the Final Act is an optimistic expression of faith, for as the
Scriptures define faith, it is "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things
unseen." [Ref. 9: Hebrews 11: 1] Each state, for its own reasons, subscribed to this ar-
ticle of faith when it signed the document.
Interestingly, elements of this hopeful and idealistic Final Act have found new life
in two central documents of the CPSU - the 1985 revision of the Party Program, and
the 1977 "Brezhnev" Constitution of the L'.S.S.R.
In Part Three (entitled "The Tasks of the CPSU on the International Scene, in the
Drive for Peace and Social Progress"), Section II (entitled "Relations with Capitalist
Countries. Struiidc for a Lasting Peace and Disarmament"), the Program savs:
11
The Communist Party of the Soviet Union firmly and consistently upholds the
Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. The
policy of peaceful coexistence as understood by the CPSU presupposes:
renunciation of war and the use or threat of forece as a means of settling disputed
issues, and their settlement through negotiations; non-interference in internal affairs
and respect for the legitimate interests of each other: the right of the peoples inde-
pendently to decide their destinies; strict respect for the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of states and the inviolability of their borders; cooperation on the basis of
complete equality and mutual benefit; fulfilment in good faith of commitments
arising from generally rcognized principles and norms of international law and from
international treaties concluded. [Ref. 10: p. 94]
This passage is very close to the wording of the Final Act. Here the guiding writ of the
CPSU drafted in 1985 is congruent with the lofty sentiments of the 1975 Final Act.
The Soviet Constitution of 1977, notably in Articles 28, 29 and 30, reflects an in-
corporation of the language of detente. Articles 28 and 30 deleted polemical references
to world capitalism, while Article 29 has more direct statements of the themes of the
Final Act written into it [Ref. 11: p. 255]. Brezhnev, writing in World Marxist Review ,
confirmed this analysis when he said,
Yet another aspect of the international importance of the new Soviet constitution
is that in both spirit and letter it serves the cause of peace, the security of the peo-
ples, the strengthening of the anti-imperialist solidarity of all progressive forces . . .
By including in the new constitution a special chapter enacting the peaceful charac-
ter of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, our people have once again stressed
their determination to follow the Leninist course of peace, the course of ridding
humanity of the horrors of war. of the material hardships and mortal dangers im-
plicit in the arms race. This chapter contains clauses corresponding to the funda-
mental obligations that the Soviet Union has undertaken as a participant in vital
international agreements including the Final Act of the Helsinki conference.
Indisputably this imparts additional weight to the efforts that are being made in the
world for a further normalization of the international situation, for the development
of detente. [Ref. 8: p. 199]
Here we see the language of hope expressed in the Final Act "turned on its head" by the
then "high representative" of the Soviet Union. Noting the year of this article as 1977,
the invocation of the Final Act as a legitimizing element of the new constitution seems
ironic in light of the Soviet revolutionary involvements in Angola. Ethiopia, South
Yemen and Mozambique that were then underway. This comparison of repeated Soviet
conciliatory themes (such as normalization, detente and peaceful coexistence) with
Soviet international conduct yields the impression that Western listeners to Soviet
conciliatory language should be wan." and vigilant, not confident and secure regarding
Soviet expressions of goodwill.
F. POLITICAL WILL
The general preamble to the Final Act states that the signatory nations were "mo-
tivated by the political will, in the interest of their peoples." This section is devoted to
analysis and conjecture regarding the impetus of the political wills that operated in the
U.S. and Soviet CSCE negotiating moves. We are freer to analyze expressions of U.S.
political will of that day because there is much on the record in the form of reporting
contemporary to the conference, and of subsequent analysis. The secretive nature of the
Soviet state limits us to less definite footing in conjecture and inference.
1. U.S. Political Will
American political will was rocked by a succession of shocks before, throughout,
and after the CSCE. The withdrawal from Vietnam, with its attendant effect of causing
America to be wary of involvement in Third World conflicts, was followed by the do-
mestic shock of the Watersate scandal and the resignation of President Nixon. This was
part of the turbulent background of the American experience during the years of the
CSCE. Writing in retrospect, after the end of the Nixon presidency. Kissinger penned
this epilogue, commenting on the drama outlined above,
We will never know what might have been possible had America not consumed its
authority in that melancholy period. Congressional assaults on a weakened Presi-
dent robbed him of both the means of containment and the incentives for Soviet
moderation, rendering resistance impotent and at the same time driving us toward
a confrontation without a strategy or the means to back it up. The domestic base
for our approach to East-West relations eroded. We lost the carrot in the debate
over Jewish emigration that undercut the 1972 trade agreement with the Soviet Un-
ion. And the stick became ineffective as a result of progressive restrictions on
executive authority from 1973 to 1976 that doomed Indochina to destruction,
hamstrung the President's powers as Commander-in-Chief, blocked military assist-
ance to key allies, and nearly devastated our intelligence agencies. In time, the
Soviets could not resist the opportunity presented by a weakened President and a
divided America, abdicating from foreign responsibilities. By 1975 Soviet
adventurism had returned, reinforced bv an unprecedented panoplv of modern arms.
[Ref 12: p. 246]
As mentioned earlier, the U.S. negotiating style was reserved and conciliatory
in the early stages of the CSCE. The conference was seen as valuable to the Nixon
Administration as a forum for enhancing American status abroad. The tougher negoti-
ating stance and strengthening of resolve on human rights issues were results of two
domestic political pressures: the unraveling of the Nixon presidency and disdain for the
Realpolitik that Kissinger represented. Maresca confirms this interpretation of events
and adds that by the end of the negotiations that the U.S. "held its normal leadership
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position in the Western group." [Ref. 3: p. 46] It was as though the ship of state re-
turned to its preset course of opposition to Soviet political will. To broadly summarize,
this analysis of U.S. political will during the piiod of CSCE highlights a profound con-
trast with that of the Soviet Union. The U.S. president is a representative of an electoral
mandate. He remains accountable to the public will as he executes both his domestic
and international responsibilities.
2. Soviet Political Will
In contrast to the democratic concept of popular mandate and accountability
to the electorate that are common to the U.S. and her Western alliance partners, the
Soviet Union is a "party-archy" and operates under the guidance of a completely differ-
ent sort of political will.
Using the acuity of vision that only hindsight can give, one can interpret the
"Peace Program" introduced in the 24th CPSU Congress in 1970 as preparatory
groundwork for the CSCE and the CSCE as preparatory for the aggressive revolutionary
gambits of the Soviet state that followed in the latter half of the 1 9 70 ' s . Part of the
apparent Soviet desire to conclude the CSCE quickly has been attributed to Brezhnev's
desire to be able to report its successful conclusion, thus vindicating his "peace program"
to the 25th Party Congress. His address to that Party Congress, delivered February
24th, 1976 reflected this idea of the instrumentality of the Final Act to the CPSU's
international strategies [Ref. 8: p. 104]. The historical evidence suggests that the Soviet
peace program of that day. the CSCE. and detente itself were Soviet moves to ensure
that "all would remain quiet on the Western front" while the U.S.S.R. shifted its
expansionist focus to the Third World front and continued its nuclear and conventional
force buildup.
To summarize, Soviet political will is monopolized by the Communist Party.
The only mandate is that of the Party elite. The General Secretary is accountable to no
one other than this elite. In the matter of political will, as shown in the CSCE context.
the Soviet state is so unlike Western states as to be beyond comparison.
G. DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT
The subject of detente is broad, emotional, and controversial. As a means of re-
sisting the temptation to broaden the focus of this chapter into the vast plain of the topic
of detente, let us focus on the text of the Final Act. As was mentioned earlier, the word
detente emerges as one of the key words of the text. The preamble to Section Two oi'
Basket I contains a revealing statement which, without claiming to do so. gives us a
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concise definition of detente when it says, "The participating states. Desirous of elimi-
nating the causes of tension that may exist among them and thus contributing to the
strengthening of peace and security in the world:" To paraphrase, this statement says
that detente is intended to bring about a relaxation of East-West political tension that.
it is hoped, will reduce the risk of military conflict.
Detente may easily be seen as the driving theme for the CSCE from the Soviet per-
spective. One history of the period refers to the Final Act as the "long awaited fruit of
detente" for the Soviets [Ref. 13: p. 641]. This assessment of its value would appear to
be accurate when compared to the importance the Soviets attached to the Final Act by
weaving it into their constitution and party program. The value and usefulness of the
Final Act to Soviet foreign policy was underscored in an article in International Affairs
(Moscow) where the Izvestia political analyst Vikenti Matveyev linked the following
concepts in sequential paragraphs as he described "The Soviet Factor" in Western for-
eign policy:
1. The Soviet Union's achievement of military-strategic paritv with the U.S. in the late
1960's
2. The abandonment of U.S. military superiority for "the most expedient doctrine" of
adequacy in the military field by the "anti-communist" President Nixon
3. "New vistas" opened up by bilateral and multilateral agreements in the 1970's
4. The "milestone" of the CSCE Final Act. [Ref. 14: p. 47]
H. HUMAN RIGHTS
The Final Act has had a split personality since its conception. The original Soviet
political and territorial agenda was broadened by the NATO inclusion of humanitarian
issues. This dichotomy of purpose continued throughout the negotiations and into
subsequent political commentary. Indeed, in America the Final Act is usually referred
to as "The Helsinki Accords" with this term being synonymous with human rights. If
the Final Act is a record of the "gains of detente" for the Soviets, it is contrarywise a
reminder of Soviet excessive and arbitrary use of power in dealing with its own citizens.
In this respect, the Final Act can be said to be an important political tool for Western
democracies. It has proven to be of lesser value as a tool of influence over Soviet be-
havior. The Final Act contincd significant disclaimers as to the obligations of states to
uphold it. One modest piece of evidence of the value of the human rights issue is that
it bothers the Soviets. Matveyev, writing in the same chronological analysis of Western
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foreign policy cited earlier, implies that criticism of the Soviet Union for human rights
violations represents a twisting of the Final Act's purposes [Ref. 14: p. 47],
To summarize, it is a good and proper thing for America and the West to pressure
the Soviets on the human rights issue. It is. after all. "our half of the split personality
of the Final Act. and a very fundamental point of distinction between our system and
theirs.
I. CONCLUSIONS
This chapter was directed toward an examination of primary sources, firsthand ac-
counts and authoritative analyses in order to gain an understanding of the textual de-
notation and political connotations of the Final Act of the CSCE. Close reading and
interpretation of various pertinent sources have yielded several conclusions:
1. An appreciation for the absolutely critical role played by semantics and foreign
languages in intense international negotiations.
2. The conciliator.' language of CSCE as appropriated by Soviet leadership did not
represent a moderating change in Soviet strategy for foreign relations, as evidenced
by the period of expansion that directly followed the conference.
3. The appropriation of peaceful language by the Soviet leadership is not a new phe-
nomenon. Brezhnev's public statements about peace were quite similar to current
statements by Gorbachev.
4. The true value of the CSCE to the Soviet Union may not be the content of the
Final Act at all, but the fact that the conference was held at their request, and
concluded in an agreement that was general and not legally binding in nature. In
other words, the appearance of dialogue and agreement may have been more im-
portant to the Soviets than the precise content of that agreement.
Finally, it does not appear from the evidence examined in this study that the signa-
ture of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on the CSCE
Final Act represented a fundamental change in Soviet foreign policy from one of con-
frontation to that of cooperation, security and confidence. Instead, it seems to have
signified only a timely change of Soviet vocabulary, an obfuscation of their ambitious
program for expanding the U.S.S.R.'s influence in the world. In this case, rather than
fostering sentiments of security in the West, the Soviet use of conciliatory language
should have caused the West to be even more wary regarding the ultimate intentions of
the CPSU.
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III. THE NUCLEAR FREEZE IN THE U.S. 1980-84
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the nuclear freeze movements in the United States "through
Soviet eyes" with the intent of determining what lessons the Soviets drew from their
observations of the phenomenon. It is based on the hypothesis that there may be a
correlation between the Soviet peace proposals of the late 19S0's and the nuclear freeze
phenomenon of the early 1980's. In other words, the "freeze" movements may have
provided Soviet decisionmakers with valuable insights about potential opportunities in
the "struggle for peace."
The Soviet viewpoint, drawn from the statements and analyses of the period, is the




This chapter does not provide a systematic analysis of the freeze debate from an
American viewpoint. 3 Instead, it focuses on the issue from the Soviet perspective.
B. CHRONOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
Let us attempt to gain a good footing in fact before we launch out into the uncertain
waters of interpretation. The debate over the nuclear freeze was largely contained within
the period 1980-84, and was coincident with President Reagan's first term in office. The
following timetable of events is not complete, but does offer a framework in which to
place the nuclear freeze phenomenon:
1963 - Test Ban Treaty
1964 - Johnson administration proposes freeze on certain strategic
systems at Geneva talks
1970 - Senate "Anti-MIRV" resolution sponsored by Senator Brooke
passes 73-6
1972 - SALT I signed. (May)
1979 - Carter proposes bilateral freeze on production of nuclear
weapons. SALT II signed (June). Soviets invade
3 For an insightful analysis of the nuclear freeze from the U.S. perspective, see Adam
Garfinkle's The Politics of ike Nuclear Freeze, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984.
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Afghanistan (December 26).
19S0 - Carter suspends transfers of high technology
systems to the U.S.S.R. and asks the
Senate to delay SALT II ratification (January)- U.S. JCS
testify before Congress that Carter's FY 81 budget is
insufficient to keep pace with Soviet improvements.
1981 - Reagan inauguration. Weinberger named Secretary of Defense
(January).
- President Reagan announces details of strategic defense
program of 100 MX's in hardened silos by 1990, full
development of B-l bomber, full development of stealth
aircraft (2 October).
- Reagan comments on possibility of limited nuclear exchange
in Europe (16 October).
- Alexander Haig (Secretary of State) talks of NATO firing
"nuclear warning shots" in early stages of European war
(4 November).
- President Reagan offers Soviets "zero option" (18 November).
1982 - Large anti-nuclear demonstration in New York (14 June).
- House defeats first freeze resolution (H.J. Res. 321) 202-
204 (5 August).
- U.S. announces "Dense Pack" MX basing scheme (November).
- Congress approves record peacetime budget but witholds money
for MX production (December).
1983 - President Reagan announces SDI plans (March).
- U.S. Catholic bishops call for nuclear freeze.
- TV film "The Day After" attracts 100 million viewers (20 Nov).
- Soviet delegation withdraws from Geneva INF talks (23 Nov).
- Soviet delegation withdraws from START talks with no date
for a resumption of negotiations agreed (14 December).
1984 - Ronald Wilson Reagan reelected President (November)
The passage of the 1983 Mouse freeze resolution is generally considered to be the
highwater mark of the freeze movement. U.S. News and World Report writers Mashek
and Hawkins offered this 1986 epitaph for the freeze movement:
While the disarmament cause takes credit for forcing Reagan to discuss arms control
with the Soviets and focusing public attention on the risk of nuclear war. even its
biggest boosters acknowledge their demoralizing flop in the 1984 election. Despite
raising more than S6 million and maintaining "a huge and constantly growing ac-
tivity," the antinuclear forces not only failed to defeat the President, they couldn't
even make the peace issue a major campaign topic. [Ref. 15: p. 22]
Having briefly established its chronological framework, let us move to the topic of how
the Soviets interpreted the American policy debate.
C. SOVIET INTERPRETATIONS
This section treats six areas of Soviet interpretation that are evident from a sampling
of their analyses of the nuclear freeze period.
1. Observations on the American political system
2. Psychological pressure
3. Media pressure
4. Pressure from elites
5. Pressure from public opinion
6. Reactionary response of the Administration.
Limited commentary will be offered with regard to the context in which the passages are
framed. For the most part, further analysis is deferred for the final chapters of this
study.
1. Observations on the American Political System
Soviet observers of the nuclear freeze phenomenon recognized the American
political system as being both responsive to pressures exerted on it by its heterogeneous
components and accountable to a popular mandate. Considering the opposition party
of that day, P.T. Podlesnyy said:
The pernicious effects of the White House's anti-Soviet policy line, including its ef-
fects on the United States' own interests, were also mentioned in a recent report
prepared by Democratic congressmen in conjunction with the Democratic Party
National Committee: "The Reagan Administration has severely complicated re-
lations with friendly countries and developing states .... Diplomatic solutions to
problems, including the problems of arms control, have been secondary on the ad-
ministration's list of priorities." [Ref. 16: p. 7]
Concerning the nature of the office of the Presidency, the author had this to say
about the then upcoming election and the Soviet preference for a "more realistic" presi-
dent.
Appeals for more realistic policy in relations with the USSR, for the atten-
uation of anti-Soviet rhetoric, for interaction by the two countries in the resolution
of questions of war and peace and for regular political dialogue on various levels are
characteristic of the contenders for the 1984 Democratic Party presidential nomi-
nation. All of them have pointedly criticized Reagan's hard anti-Soviet line.
Time will tell if Washington is capable of making a positive response to the
mounting worries of millions of Americans about the constant escalation of tension
and confrontation in relations with the USSR. A great deal will depend on the
balance of power within the United States and on the ability of people with a real-
istic frame of mind to display enough consistency and persistence to prevent the
further deterioration of relations with the USSR and to give them a constructive and
stable nature. [Ref. 16: p. 9]
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Another writer, A.B. Pankin, offered this political analysis of media coverage of the
freeze:
During the 1 982 congressional campaign, the freeze attracted attention primarily as
a Democratic Party campaign slogan, and this clearly reflected the liberal-centrist
media's close ties with the Democrats. If. on the other hand, we analyze news items
for 1983, we could conclude that the movement had almost disappeared by this time
and that all of its activity was confined primarily to debates in the House of Repre-
sentatives on the freeze resolution and to the adoption of the Catholic bishops'
pastoral message. Both of these events were important, but they were far from the
only milestones in the movement's activity. [Ref. 17: p. 24]
We will examine this author's viewpoints in more depth later in this chapter.
A fitting statement to conclude this short sampling of Soviet observations on
the American political scene is drawn from an article by Vadim Zagladin, Deputy Head
of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSL". Speaking in
slightly veiled terms, he gives his analysis of the Reagan administration's policy toward
the Soviet Union in terms of the correlation of forces.
But a return to confrontation failed to yield the results hoped for by those who in-
spired it. First of all, socialism disrupted the attempts to tip the balance of military
forces and prevented the military-strategic equilibrium from being upset. Further-
more, the counter-offensive launched by imperialism provoked a broad mobilization
of social forces for peace. The struggle against the nuclear missile threat created by
the actions of the USA and NATO was joined by forces that previously stayed out
of it and even disapproved of it. Certain changes took place in time in the attitude
of the ruling circles of the United States allies. They gradually came to be convinced
that their goals could not be reached through confrontation, which merely increased
the threat of war and posed a greater dancer for the existence of entire nations.
[Ref. 18: p. 3]
Apparently this "mobilization of social forces for peace" included the U.S. nuclear freeze
movements as well as the European antinuclear movements.
2. Psychological Pressure
This area of Soviet interpretation is particularly germane to the overall direction
of this study, as it reflects the high degree of attention paid by the Soviets to the psy-
chological impact of nuclear weapons on Americans. One article in SSiiA (USA), with
the sobering title "The Nuclear Threat and the Fear Factor" speaks directly to the point
of psychological pressure. Of the role that 'feelings of fear" could have on the balance
of world political forces, the author Zamoshkin said.
On the other hand, the same feelings of fear of nuclear war could stimulate an
antimilitarist movement after they reached a certain level of pervasiveness, intensity
and urszencv. Fear could stimulate a desire lor a nuclear freeze, the limitation of
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U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms and peaceful agreements with the Soviet Union for
these purposes. The fear of a horribly destructive nuclear war could play a sobering
role with regard to adventuristic power politics. It could also lead to greater caution
in the use of threats of force against other countries, especially the USSR.
[Ref. 19: p. 5]
Zamoshkin reduced psychology to its barest political core in this passage in
which he outlined two paths that the U.S. could have taken with regard to nuclear dis-
armament. The first is presented as sanity and the second as sickness.
The loss of faith in military invulnerability aroused two kinds of ideological
and psychological reactions in the United States.
The first was a more realistic and sober assessment of the change in cir-
cumstances — and it was quite a radical change — and the realization that the United
States was now in the same position that other countries had always been in. in-
cluding the Soviet Union. The development of political realism in the United States
could and did lead to the acknowledgement of the fundamentally objective equality
of the United States and the USSR in terms of military security and to a rational
search for peaceful accords to secure a mutually guaranteed reduction of the threat
of nuclear war.
The second type of reaction, which could be described as "neurotic." was
connected with the psychological shock produced by the disintegration of familiar
beliefs about U.S. military vulnerability. For an understanding of the tenor of this
type of psychological reaction, it is important to recall that it was born in the at-
mosphere of "cold war," which created a high level of tension in Soviet-American
relations. This is also the reason why this new, unfamiliar and painful awareness
of the nation's military vulnerability began to be associated with the USSR and its
legitimate desire to bring its nuclear weapons up to the level of American weapons.
This type of reaction can rightfully be called "neurotic" because it gave rise to mor-
bid and irrational fears, confusion and even hysteria, which were widely used in the
1950's bv McCarthvites and later bv militant anticommunists and militarists.
[Ref. 19: pp. 1-2J
3. Public Opinion
Zamoshkin. in his piece on the factor of "nuclear fear" supports the impression
that the Soviets, while they remain committed to Marxist ideology and long-standing
Soviet interpretations of reality — as evidenced by the last citation, are also capable of
drawing lessons from analyses of social and political life attitudes in the United States.
Consider this passage concerning public opinion sampling.
Up to this point, we have cited data on American public opinion in general
to demonstrate the overall effect of the "fear factor'' on the American approach to
Soviet-American relations. We can assume, however, that various types ol~ con-
nections between the "fear factor" and certain ideological and political attitudes exist
in the minds of specific individuals.
Modern computers can aid in revealing the main differences betweeen these
types of connections. This is done by means of something called "cluster analysis,"
during the course of which the computer categorizes respondents according to certin
characteristic combinations of views they express on various issues.
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An interesting example of the use of public opinion "cluster analysis" can
be found in a 19S4 study by researchers from the Public Agenda Foundation in
collaboration with the Brown University Center for Foreign Policy Development.
The results of this study are important to us because the level of tear and anxiety
with regard to nuclear war was the main parameter used in the categorization of
respondents. The second parameter was the level of anti-Soviet ideological biases
and prejudices. The third and fourth parameters recorded different approaches to
nuclear arms issues and Soviet-American relations. The computers then classified
respondents according to the combinations of their opinions, views and positions
on all four parameters. There were four such groups. [Ref. 19: pp. 8-9]
Note that in early 1985 (February), Zamoshkin is interpreting the results of an elaborate
computerized study conducted in 19S2. A comparable U.S. commentary on Harvey
Lauer's "cluster analysis" of attitudes toward the U.S.S.R. and the threat of nuclear
weapons appeared in the Fall 1984 issue of Foreign Affairs [Ref. 20] only months before
Zamoshkin' s article. The value of assessing American public opinion can justifiably be
read into Grigori Lokshin's 1987 use of the term "common sense" when he says,
Never in history has the problem of war and peace been so crucial for the very ex-
istence of humanity as in this nuclear-missile and space age. The question "To be
or not to be?" posed by life itself, induces millions in all countries to seriously reap-
praise today's grim realities. A new political thinking is shaping up. This trend,
based on common sense and a natural desire for self-preservation, is becoming more
and more irreversible in mass consciousness, stimulating a countinuous renewal and
extension of the social and political basis of the anti-war movement, of the entire
world coalition of the forces of reason and peace in the making. (Emphasis added.)
[Ref. 21. p. 10]
Here Lokshin blends the antinuclear movement, widespread Western fears of nuclear
weapons and the Soviet concept of correlation of forces.
4. Media Pressure
In describing the contradictory position of the "liberal-centrist" media in their
attitude toward the "peace movement'" A.B. Pankin wrote.
First of all. we should note that oi\q important aspect of the liberal-centrist national
media's attitude toward the peace movement is colored by the media's position as
a simultaneously political and commercial institution. This is reflected in two ways.
On the one hand, the media seek, an audience by concentrating (and causing the
reader to concentrate) on sensational news items, novelty, melodramatic events,
conflicts and the actions of famous people, and this largely determines their choice
of subject matter and the accuracy with which they cover these events. At the same
time, performing the functions of "an early warning system" and an information
agent for the ruling class as a whole, the media must display a certain degree of
objectivity or they will be simply unable to satisfy the information needs of the U.S.
political elite, \\lcf. 17: p. 17]
22
His phrases "early warning system" and "the information needs of the U.S. political elite"
are interesting. They show the calculating nature of his analysis.
A second excerpt from Pankin's article contains a phrase which may represent
a prototype of Gorbachev's "new political thinking" formulation:
Let us summarize our conclusions. The peace movement and its major concerns are
covered by the media from the vantage point of the liberal-centrist establishment.
The strategic aims of this consist in imposing establishment ideas on the movement,
neutralizing its more consistent elements and using its power to increase possible
opposition to the Reagan Administration's extremist line in the upper echelons of
government. Here there is not even a [race of [he new line of reasoningfor [he nuclear
age, the line advised by Albert Einstein, or of the humanitarian thinking so ener-
getically promoted by peace activists of our day, but there are attempts to update
the old theories of "intimidation" and "deterrence" and to make them seem less
dangerous to the public. There is also an obvious desire to de-escalate and stabilize
the arms race: and this desire is so much more realistic than the Reagan Adminis-
tration's wish for military superiority to the USSR. (Emphasis added)
[Ref. 17: p. 25]
5. Pressure from Elites
Various Soviet analysts assessed the impact of elites on U.S. policy during the
freeze period. P.T. Podlesnyy termed one such group "the American foreign policy elite:"
Members of the American foreign policy elite are also somewhat disturbed by the
fact that now that the United States has begun the deployment of the new American
missiles in Western Europe against the wishes of the West European public, it might
have to pay a disproportionate political price for this in the future due to the in-
crease in anti-American feelings on the continent as a result of West European
worries about the possible subversion of detente and about the new round of the
nuclear arms race. [Ref. 16: p. 8]
Continuing on the same theme, Podlesnny said:
The results of White House foreign policy activity have become the subject of heated
debates in the U.S. political and academic communities, the members of which have
expressed concern and anxiety over the tendency of Washington's emphasis on force
in relations with the USSR to increase the danger of nuclear war, destabilize inter-
national relations, create tension in virtually all spheres ofAmerican-Soviet relations
and erect a high wall of suspicion in these relations. It is indicative that
Washington's anti-Soviet policy line is even being criticized by authoritative mem-
bers oi' the American foreign policy establishment who were directly involved in the
engineering and conduct of U.S. policy toward the USSR for many years and who
learned from their own experience that it is futile to deal with the USSR from a
position of strength and diktat. [Ref. 16: p. 6]
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6. Reactionary Response of the Administration
As it is used here, the term reactionary may be defined as meaning "resisting the
'progressive' proposals of the CPSU for disarmament according to its designs." This is
the content of the following polemical response to the Administration's "reactionary"
policies during the period in which the nuclear freeze movements were prominent and
successful in gaining public attention.
Washington also hopes to weaken the peace movement, turn it against the USSR.
prevent the further spread of the discussions begun in the ruling class on matters of
American-Soviet relations, and discredit the politicians who criticize Washington's
power politics and advocate the restoration of constructive relations with the USSR.
Finally, the hard anti-Soviet rhetoric reflects the rabid, pathological anticommunism
of Ronald Reagan and some of his closest advisors. The anti-Soviet campaigns are
consistent with their ideological beliefs and political outlook, and they conceal the
administration's lack of a more thorouahlv considered and balanced policv toward
the USSR. [Ref. 16: p. 4]
Interestingly, in the same article Podlesnyy offers a concise Soviet analysis of his hy-
pothesized U.S. grand strategy of the day by saying,
It is on these premises that the chief aim of Reagan's policy rests: the comprehen-
sive buildup of U.S. and NATO military strength, the maximum restriction of trade
and scientific contacts and the more energetic use of ideological leverage to exert
stronger pressure on the USSR in order to disrupt plans for Soviet peaceful con-
struction, undermine the bases of socialism, weaken the Soviet Union's foreign pol-
itical positions and reduce the sphere of its influence in the world. The
administration's approach is devoid of any kind of positive program to correct the
abnormal state of affairs in American-Soviet relations and is permeated with the
hope that the continued exertion of pressure on the USSR could force it to make
some kind of additional concessions of unilateral benefit to the United States and
the West in general. [Ref. 16: pp. 1-2]
D. CONCLUSIONS
This sampling of a few Soviet commentaries on the nuclear freeze movement in the
U.S. and on American political life in general yields several impressions:
1. They reflect a will to base Soviet policies on careful and sober assessments with
regard to American political and societal values.
2. The sentiments they express show a high degree of continuity with peace initiatives
proposed by the current Soviet leadership.
3. The potential propaganda value of the fear of nuclear weapons among Americans
was noted by Soviet analysts.
4. Soviet experts are capable of discerning opportunities to capitalize on trends
internal to the American political and value systems in framing Soviet strategies
ol' influence.
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IV. CONTEMPORARY SOVIET PEACE PROGRAMS
A. INTRODUCTION
This study began by considering the opening and closing paragraphs of General
Secretary' Gorbachev's "direct appeal to the peoples of the USSR, America, and the
world." in his book Perestroika . This chapter deals with the content of Gorbachev's
peace program, as outlined in this book and in other statements. Of the many themes
of Perestroika
,
the central one for Western listeners seems to be that it represents new
political thinking for a world in peril of destruction. It is an appeal for nuclear disar-
mament. Gorbachev claims to have an altogether new approach, which he describes as
the only hope for mankind. He appeals to Western publics to align themselves with him
and to bring pressure on their governments to hasten the advent of a nuclear-free world.
Speaking in the context of capitalizing on the deep fear of nuclear weapons among
American publics and of mobilizing them politically toward antinuclear activism, Yu.
A, Zamoshkin wrote in 1985:
In this context, the political and propaganda significance of Soviet proposals and
peace initiatives is indisputable, but unfortunately the American public is usually
not sufficiently informed about these. [Ref. 19: p. 14]
This quote may very well express the intent of General Secretary Gorbachev in broadly
communicating his program for peace directly to the American public. There appears
to be a certain irony in Zamoshkin's words, in that if Westerners were truly well-
informed, they would receive these proposals with great caution and skepticism.
Three elements of background information regarding contemporary Soviet peace
programs must be discussed before we turn to the major themes of Gorbachev's "new
political thinking:"
1. Mechanisms for peace
2. Concepts of peace
3. The Brezhnev peace program of the 1970s
This chapter concludes with several observations on the long-term implications of
the current appeals for peace, cooperation and disarmament originating from the lead-
ership of the CPSU.
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B. MECHANISMS FOR PEACE
A description of Soviet institutions that are charged with "campaigning for peace"
is necessary for Westerners to grasp the full context of current peace initiatives. This
treatment is brief, because it is intended as background to the main focus of this chapter.
The asymmetries between the Soviet and U.S. systems of government are highlighted
in the areas of peace programming, propaganda, and the use of the media. Western
societies such as the United States have few, if any, parallels to institutionalized Soviet
peace programming. It is precisely because of these asymmetries that Westerners need
to protect themselves from "mirror imaging" and the projection of Western values and
concepts on the Soviets.
Four aspects of Soviet peace "mechanisms" are discussed here.
1. Prominent organizations involved in peace programming
2. Background on the International Department of the Central Committee of the
CPSU (ID)
3. Resources Available To Peace Institutions
4. Role of the press and media in peace programming
1. Organizations Involved in Peace Programming
The U.S. State Department has identified two organizations that are engaged in
coordinating propaganda and active measures to affect public opinion. The first or-
ganization is the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The
ID is currently headed by long time ambassador to the United States, Anatoliy
Dobrynin. The ID maintains ties with over 70 pro-Soviet Communist parties, with nu-
merous front organizations, and with national liberation movements. The second or-
ganization involved in "peace programming" active measures is Service "A"
(Disinformation and Active Measures) of the First Chief Directorate (Foreign Intelli-
gence) of the KGB. This organization is charged with coordinating and planning the
dissemination of "false and provocative information'' designed to influence or deceive
both governments and publics outside the Soviet Bloc. [Rcf. 2: p. 219)
The Politburo of the CPSU establishes policy for these organizations and coor-
dinates their activities. The research institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in-
volved with international relations operate under the International Department
[Ref. 2: p. 218]. The Academy established the Institute for the Study of the USA and
Canada in 1968. The institute's chief. Georgi Arbatov. in a book written with Willem
Oltmans, had this to sav about its functions.
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[We study] American and Canadian economic problems, domestic and social prob-
lems, political parties, the electoral processes, and so forth. We also study American
military policy, not the U.S. military establishment as such, but the impact of mili-
tary expenditures and programs, doctrines and postures on American foreign policy,
including, of course. American-Soviet relations. We also study problems of arms
control. A special department does research on problems of U.S. foreign policy in
various regions, such as Europe, the Far Hast, the Middle East, and in developing
nations. There is a department thai studies American public opinion, ideology, and
culture. (Emphasis added.) [Rcf. 22: p. 21]
This book, published in 19S1, along with another book by Arbatov written nearly a
decade earlier, will be discussed in the section on concepts of peace.
Vadim Zagladin, First Deputy of the ID for the last ten years, gave insight to
the overall purpose of these peace programming organizations when he wrote the fol-
lowing in International Affairs in 1985.
The anti-imperialist front in the world is extremely wide and its activity has assumed
unprecedented scope. Therefore, to correctly assess the state and perspectives of
world politics it is imperative to take into account the balance of forces between
imperialism and all its opponents.
And finally, the fourth parameter, which in our view has acquired particular
significance in the 1970's and 1980's when the antiwar movement has reached such
an unprecedented scope, is the balance of forces between the opponents of war and
the narrow but highly injluential circles of capitalist society who favor a military way
of resolving world contradictions "through strength." (Emphasis added.)
[Ref. 18: p. 70]
The CPSU Central Committee has established the organizations described earlier in or-
der to bring political pressure on Western governments through the management of in-
formation and perceptions. In the italicized phrase above, Zagladin continues the Soviet
practice of attributing the causes of conflict with the West to "capitalist society," and
even more specifically to "narrow but highly influential circles," which one may reckon
to be synonymous with the "military-industrial complex," since this is the formula often
used in Soviet writings.
2. Background of the International Department
The organizational heritage of the International Department gives a useful in-
sight to its functions and likely raison d'etre:
Between the two World Wars. CPSU relations with other communist parties and
early active measures-type operations were handled by the Third International, or
Comintern, which was disbanded by Stalin as a gesture of good will to the allies in
1943. The ID was set up sometime afterward as successor to the Comintern. (The
ID shared the "successor" label with the Cominform during the latter organization's
short life.) Until 1957, the ID handled relations with both ruling and nonruling
communist parties, but the 1956 crises in Hungary and Poland led the Soviets to
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overhaul their relations with ruling communist parties. This responsibility was taken
from the ID and given to a new Department for Liaison with the Communist and
Workers Parties of the Socialist Countries. [Ref. 23: p. 3]
The above being the organizational heritage of the ID, Arbatov's benign and purely
academic description of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.A. and Canada's functions
does not seem likely.
3. Resources Available to Peace Institutions
Using funding as an indicator of the Soviet government's commitment to these
organizations and their functions, the following estimates have been made:
• S63 million - annual cost of propaganda and political activities of major front or-
ganizations operating outside the U.S.S.R. [Ref. 24: p. 44]
• S 4 billion - annual cost of total Soviet propaganda effort. [Ref 2: p. 215]
4. Role of the Press and Media in Peace Programming
A fourth asymmetrical factor in the "struggle for peace" is the use of the com-
munication media in the Soviet Union.
Speaking in the context of democratization of the Soviet system as meaning that
citizens are now permitted to comment on the effectiveness of government efforts with-
out fear of reprisal, Gorbachev has provided an interesting insight regarding the role of
the Soviet press in his plan for restructuring within the Soviet Union. 4
The press must become even more effective. It should not leave in peace loafers,
profit-seekers, time-servers, suppressors of criticism, and demagogues: it should
more actively help those who are selflessly working for perestroika. A lot here de-
pends on the local Party committees. If the Party committee reorganizes its work, the
press does so to.
I want to emphasize that the press should unite and mobilize people rather than
disuniting them and generating offence and a lack of confidence. Renewal of society
also means striving to assert the dignity of man. his elevation and his honor. Criti-
cism can be an effective instrument of perestroika only if it is based on absolute
truth and scrupulous concern for justice.
To uphold the fundamental values of socialism is a tradition of our press.
(Emphasis added.) [Ref. 1: pp. 78-9]
Turning to the Soviet view of the usefulness of the world press as a vehicle for
expressing their official viewpoints, Stanislav Levchenko, a former KGB disinformaton
4 Compare the political bias contained in this statement regarding the Soviet press with that
contained in A.B. Pankin's earlier statement regarding the "liberal centrist" media in the U.S. found
on page 22 of this study.
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officer in Japan, offered these insights (after describing two groups used in Soviet disin-
formation activities -- KGB foreign agents and "agents of influence"):
And Levchenko identified a third group among journalist';, that is unwitting agents
of influence -- foreign correspondents in Moscow and other Communist capitals, for
example, who become dependent on translators and other support personnel fur-
nished by the Soviet Government. These, Mr. Levchenko said, are 100-percent
KGB agents. Some of these correspondents, hard up for information, may. more-
over, be set up with "confidential sources" that are actually channels for KGB in-
formation or disinformation. He gave two examples of inspired stories that gained
wide currency by this route. One concerned the pro- Western proclivities of
Andropov, who was said to like jazz, wear sneakers, and the like. Another was the
notion that the Politburo is divided into hawks and doves, a division which.
Levchenko maintained, is out of the question. Something similar is happening now.
he said, as Soviet "sources" put it out that Gorbachev is preoccupied with reforming
the domestic economv and thus too busv to conduct a visorous foreisn policv.
[Ref 2: pp. 27-8]
In both the domestic and international dimensions, the Soviet use of the press as an
instrument of the party in forwarding its policy programs reflects a powerful contrast
with the West. With these four facets of Soviet "peace" institutions in mind, let us turn
to "peaceful" concepts that have been transmitted to the West by these institutions.
C. CONCEPTS OF PEACE
Three recurrent concepts are examined here as necessary aids in understanding re-
cent and contemporary Soviet peace programming:
1. Soviet usage of the word peace
2. Correlation of forces
3. Peaceful coexistence
1. Soviet Usage of the Word Peace
The operative Soviet definition of peace is linked with the universal victory of
socialism today, just as it was when Lenin penned his line "disarmament is the ideal of
socialism" referred to in the introduction to this study. Deputy Chief of the Soviet Army
and Navy Main Political Directorate, Dmitri Volkoganov, used the word in this sense
when he said,
. . .the real struggle for peace is not a kind of abstract form of pacifist condemnation
of war "in general." It is above all the exposure of the true culprits of the terrible
danger threatening mankind. It is a struggle against those who are blocking the
peace initiatives of socialist countries and who are unwilling to abandon the criminal
idea of solving [he main contradiction of the age by nuclear force. (Emphasis added.)
[Ref 23: p. 16]
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This concept of peace is quite different from that common in the West. Also noteworthy
in this statememt is Volkoganov's slanderous insinuation that there are people in West-
ern governments who want to conduct a nuclear war against the Soviet Union. The
Soviet expatriate dissident Vladimir Bukovsky, speaking of the early days of the So\iet
period, elucidated the communists' concept of peace when he wrote:
Once they recognized the power of "peace" as a weapon, the Communists have never
let go of it. In this respect, it must be admitted, Soviet politics have invariably been
most "peaceful." We must at the same time bear in mind that according to Com-
munist dogma, wars are the "inevitable consequence of the clash of imperialist in-
terests under capitalism," and therefore they will continue to be inevitable as long
as capitalism exists. The only way to save humanity from the evil of wars, then, is
to "liberate" it from the "chains of capitalism." Accordingly, there is a very precise
distinction to be made between "just wars" and "unjust wars." "Just wars" are those
fought "in the interests of the proletariat." It is perfectly simple and perfectly clear:
just wars are absolutely justifiable because they lead to the creation of a world in
which there will be no wars, forevermore. Proletarians are all brothers, are they not?
So. once the world is rid of capitalists, imperialists, and various other class enemies,
why should those who are left light one another? [Ref. 25: p. 37]
2. Correlation of Forces
The Soviet concept of the correlation of forces involves a holistic assessment of
all instruments of influence available to them. Vadim Zagladin's evaluation of the role
played by peace groups in the West in opposing imperialism and its policies cited earlier
is a good example of the concept applied to international relations. 5 A.B. Pankin, writing
in 19S4, in the journal SShA (U.S. A), concluded an article on the media and the peace
movement by saying,
Furthermore, the strength of the American peace movement is compounded by the
fact that it is acting in unison with all other world forces toward the preservation
of human civilization. [Ref. 17: p. 26]
From these few examples we can see that the Soviets consider the correlation of peace
forces an important facet of their peace program and their effort to bring into being a
world order more to their liking than that currently in place.
3. Peaceful Coexistence
The third and final background concept of peace in this section is that of
peaceful coexistence. From a purely Western point of view, this formulation appears to
mean "let bygones be bygones," or a truce between warring tactions. This is not the
sense that has prevailed in Soviet usage. In his 1973 book. The War of Ideas in Con-
5 See page 27 of this study.
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temporary International Relations, Georgi Arbatov implied that the Soviet focus is on the
ultimate victor} - oC socialism, and not on a world free of armed confrontation when he
wrote:
Peaceful coexistence, on the other hand, is the only possible alternative not only to
a world war but aiso to the cold war. Its objective is to create firm guarantees of
peace, improve the entire system of international relations, and consolidate in these
relations genuinely democratic principles conforming to the interests of the peoples
and to the requirements of the nuclear age. Peaceful coexistence implies more than
that no state of war exists at the given time. It calls for a determined struggle
against imperialist aggression, for the eradication of all the flashpoints of another
world war. for the settlement of all tension-building disputes and conflicts by nego-
tiation and in the interests of the peoples, for the cessation of the arms race, for the
creation of an effective international system of preventing aggression, and for the
promotion of economic, scientific, technological, and cultural relations between
countries. [Ref. 26: p. 273]
Although it was not stated directly here. Western audiences should remain aware that
according to Soviet political theory, only the CPSU knows what is "in the interest of the
peoples," since it alone is the true vanguard of the proletariat. Arbatov explained that
peaceful coexistence was not possible in the area of ideology, by using the special logic
of Marxist class struggle:
The reasons why the Communist parties, while proclaiming the normalisation of
international relations as one of their aims, consider the ideological struggle inevi-
table and necessary are quite evident.
The essense of the Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence is that it envis-
ages the parallel existence not simply of different states, but of states belonging to
opposite social systems. Hence the relations between these systems cannot be confined
to conventional diplomatic relations, important as they are in themselves. The existence
of the two systems has another aspect, namely, that each o[ them embodies the rule
of a class -- the capitalist class in one case, and the wrorking class in the other, and
that an uncompromising struggle, forming the basic content of our epoch, rages
between them. The struggle between these classes began long before the first
Communist Party came into being, and it was not called to life by Marx.
As the Marxists-Leninists see it, this struggle can only end with the triumph
of communism. Socialism's victory in the countries that today form the world so-
cialist system is an important stage on the road to this objective. But this success
does not and cannot mean the termination of the class struggle. Between the
working class and the bourgeoisie the struggle goes on and will continue in individ-
ual countries and on the world scene, which, in addition to the clash of political and
economic interests, witnesses a historic duel between the two social systems. This
duel, which is unfolding in the economic, political and ideological spheres, began
more than half a century ago and it will not end until the more progressive system
is completely victorious. Such is the incontrovertible law o[ social development, a
law dictated not by somebodv's evil will but by objective conditions. (Emphasis
added.) [Ref. 26: p. '274]
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1973 might seem a long time ago in the perspective of examining contemporary Soviet
designs, were it not that the Soviets are generally recognized (by experts in the West) to
have a very long-term orientation in international relations. In this regard it is impor-
tant to note that Arbatov is in the same position today under Gorbachev as he was in
1973 under Brezhnev and performs the same function as an ideological fighter for
"peace" in a struggle that "cannot be confined to conventional diplomatic relations."
Continuing on the same theme of peaceful coexistence, the same speaker on the same
subject uses the same term, with a less threatening connotation, in this excerpt from his
1981 book.
The essence of the Leninist concept of peaceful coexistence is that it envis-
ages the parallel and peaceful existence of states belonging to opposite social sys-
tems. These systems differ in their economic structures, in the character of their
social relations, their values, and their ideals. In today's world the influence of ide-
ologies can't be confined only to those countries where they predominate. Ideol-
ogies constantly clash both on the global scale and within many countries. This fact
of life was not invented by us and it cannot be ignored. To Americans, proud of
their pluralist tradition, this should be perfectly clear. But once an ideological
struggle is turned into a crusade or a witch hunt, it immediately acquires the po-
tential to arouse and aggravate conflicts. History has presented us with many ex-
amples of this kind. Even more numerous are the cases when ideology and ideas in
general were only a coverup for actions motivated by other things, like greed, lust
for power, and so on. One example could be the messianic pretentions of the
Spanish conquistadors.
Ideology and propaganda may also be used as instruments of a certain
policy, in particular a policy of subversion and destabilization of other societies. It's
true both for times of war and times of peace. The Cold War was a good example,
with its peculiar type of ideological struggle succinctly called "psychological war-
fare." Propaganda of this sort is in our view incompatible with detente and peaceful
coexistence. It can only damage relations between countries. (Ref. 22: p. 142]
What happened in the eight years between these two statements? This writer's
impression is that the denotative meaning of peaceful coexistence did not change, but the
political mood of the day in 1981 called for less strident language when addressing
Western audiences than did the mood of 1973. This trend of molification of rhetoric
from Soviet spokesmen has apparently continued in the seven years since Arbatov's last
quote, and is reflected in the tenor of contemporary Soviet statements.
This is not a linguistic study, and to expand it too far in that direction could
endanger the objective of extracting meaning from current Soviet peace proposals.
Three conclusions, however, can be drawn from this short examination of key concepts
expressed in the Soviet struggle tor peace:
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1. The Soviets apparently see a greater value in speaking in conciliatory terms when
addressing "imperialist"audiences, since direct speech could evoke resistance that
would retard the achievement of long-term goals.
2. These statements are carefully formulated with a double entendre that is on owe side
ideologically justifiable to the home audience, and on the other side palatable to
Western hearers.
3. In a long-term perspective, the Soviet formulations have become less stridently id-
eological and more acceptable to Western publics.
The comments of a participant at a U.S. State Department conference on Soviet prop-
aganda and disinformation are related to the observations outlined above.
6
This speaker raised a separate question, namely, the role of Soviet propaganda in
strategic deception — in deceiving adversaries about what the fundamental nature
of the Soviet system is. and therefore, about what the fundamental strategic in-
tentions of the Soviet regime are. The number one propaganda, disinformation
theme, he thought, is to convince people that the Soviets are not Communists any
more. If they are Communists in the service of a revolutionary, totalitarian, ideo-
logical power, they must necessarily have unlimited objectives in the world. But if
they are not (so this deception postulates), their objectives are not necessarily un-
limited, and all sorts of things -- different forms of accommodations and compromise
- become possible. [Ref. 2: p. 29]
To conclude, the Soviets, in their use of the phrases peace and peaceful coexistence re-
main consistent with their long-standing goal of the worldwide victory of socialism.
Their concept of the correlation offorces involves a struggle for "peace" on Soviet terms
in which language plays a most influential role. The goal has not changed over the
years. The flavor of the language has, however, been adapted so as not to arouse the
West's suspicions.
D. THE BREZHNEV PEACE PROGRAM OF THE 1970'S
This section will briefly highlight two important areas of background to current
peace proposals offered by the Soviets. They are drawn from the Brezhnev era and
pre-date Mikhail Gorbachev's "new political thinking" on the subject. These two items
are:
1. Negotiations as peace tactics
2. The appeal to U.S. interest groups
6 Unfortunately Reference 2 omitted the identity of tliis participant in the discussion
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1. Negotiations as Peace Tactics
We in the West are not privy to the policy designs originated in the CPSU
Politburo that guided Brezhnev's foreign policy in the 1970s, just as we can only spec-
ulate on the motivations behind the designs of the current leadership. One observable
characteristic of the Brezhnev policy, however, was the use of negotiations and other
international fora as means of influencing Western policy. In analyzing this period,
Stanley Kober has said.
In 1971. at the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev
launched his "peace offensive." The policy of the CPSU, he declared, was "to con-
clude treaties putting a ban on nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological weapons ....
We stand for the nuclear disarmament of all states in possession of nuclear weap-
ons." This attempt to resolve fundamental problems of East-West relations through
negotiations was the purported basis of detente, which Brezhnev defined as "a
readiness to resolve differences and arguments not by force, not by threats or
saber-rattling, but by peaceful means, at the conference table. Detente is a certain
trust and abilitv to take into account the leaitimate interests of one another."
[Ref. 2: p. 189]'
Two points of interest to this study emerge from this passage. The first is that as early
as 1971 the CPSU had spoken out for total nuclear disarmament. In this regard, more
recent Soviet statements such as Gorbachev's 15 January 19S6 proposal can be seen as
continuations of long-term Soviet policy. The second point is a question. Given the
inimical natures of the "socialist" and "imperialist" systems according to the ideology of
the CPSU, do the Soviets believe that capitalists and imperialists have legitimate inter-
ests?
This use of the "conference table" as a means of forwarding Soviet long-term
strategic plans is an important legacy of the Brezhnev period. Earlier in this study we
examined the connection between the CSCE, the 1977 "Brezhnev" constitution, and the
19S5 revision of the Party Program of th CPSU. The meaning of the CSCE remains
poorly understood in the West. The question of whether it should be seen as an "anti-
Yalta" for the West which may ultimately redress grievances resulting from the earlier
pact, or be seen as a "super-Yalta" for the Soviets with regard to hegemony in Europe
is still an open question. It is evident, however, that positive allusions to the "Helsinki
solution" appear frequently in Gorbachev era Soviet writings. The current General
Secretary, speaking in a report to the CPSU Central Committe Plenary in April. 19S5.
said.
The Politburo believes that the international documents of the detente period, in-
cluding the Helsinki Final Act. have lost none of their importance. They exemplify
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the way international relations can be built if nations are guided by the principles
of equality and equal security, by the realities in the world, if they do not seek any
advantages, but mutually acceptable decisions and agreements. In connection with
the tenth anniversary of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, it
woud be useful if. on behalf of the countries which signed the Final Act. the will to
overcome dangerous tension and develop peaceful cooperation and constructive
foundations in international life were once again to be expressed in Helsinki.
[Ref 27: pp. 86-7]
Thus, a month after being selected as the representative of the collective leadership,
Gorbachev apparently was saying, "Let's keep a good thing going." In addition to the
benefit the Soviets accrued from the Helsinki Final Act regarding the tacit legitimization
of their political and territorial gains made in Europe after World War Two, at least in
the eyes of some observers, 1 they apparently see special value in the type of negotiations
that yielded the Final Act. The CSCE may have given them a "bully pulpit" from which
to demonstrate to both individual nations and alliances alike, the superpower status that
parity with the U.S. had bought them. Some insight to this question might be gained
through Gennadi Stakh's November 1987 statement in International Affairs (Moscow)
that,
The toughest line of the USA is that disarmament problems should be discussed
only between blocs ("tSte-a-tete" between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries),
that a large number of European states -- neutral and non-aligned ("n + n" group)
should be denied a say in their solution.
Attempts to deprive these countries, some of which (Yugoslavia and
Sweden) have considerable conventional potential, of the right to discuss the issues
affecting their security and the security of Europe as a whole challenge fundamental
principles, notablv the principle of the equalitv of states, enshrined in the Helsinki
Final Act. [Ref. 28: p. 109]
Perhaps the CSCE model for negotiations embodied a synergy of two forces for the
Soviets in that first, it oiTered its strategic competitors in the NATO alliance, a hope for
reconciliation and peace in the conventional Western sense, and second, an opportunity
to appeal to the individual interests of participating states. In any case, the Soviets re-
peatedly invoke the CSCE as a desirable model for future negotiations. To summarize.
since Brezhnev, negotiations seem especially desirable to the Soviets, and multinational
negotiations along the lines of the CSCE are preferred for certain purposes.
The Lnited States docs not recognize the Soviet annexation of Latvia, Lithuania and
Estonia.
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2. Appeal to Western Interest Groups
The Soviets seem to have drawn an important conclusion from watching the
American political system react to the pressures exerted on it during the Vietnam War.
Dutch analyst J. A. Emerson Vermaat brings together evidence of this from several
Soviet spokesmen.
The success of the anti-Vietnam war movement, when, according to one
Soviet observer, "the demand to end the aggression became the universal demand
of various political movements, including those in the United States." demonstrated
to Moscow the efficacy o[ public opinion in the West. Plans to create a peace
movement patterned after the anti-Vietnam war movement were worked out during
and after the World Conference of Peace Forces in Moscow in 1973. The Soviets
felt that the "correlation of forces" had never been so favorable to them. Leonid
Brezhnev declared:
"One can say with confidence that the present changes in the world situ-
ation are largely the result of the activities of public forces, of the hitherto unparal-
leled activity of the people, who are displaying sharp intolerance of arbitrary rule
and aggression and an unbending will for peace."
According to Vitally Kononov. political commentator of Pravda, "favorable
conditions enabling the peace-loving democratic forces to launch a decisive offensive
against the imperialist forces of war and aggression had arisen by the beginning of
the seventies." It is evident that the Soviet side had become well aware of the impact
movements for disarmament could make on the decision-making process in the
West. [Ref. 24: pp. 46-7]
The nuclear freeze debate in the U.S. has already been discussed at some length
in this study. The degree of political pressure generated by that movement could not
have been lost on the Soviets. Perhaps they have synthesized their findings regarding
the protest movement of the Vietnam era and the antinuclear movement of the early
19S0's and have accordingly rephrased their peaceable appeals. Something has changed
in Soviet rhetoric in the last few years. That much is sure. The comradely tones of
Perestroika have quite a different ring than these three paragraphs taken from a speech
Gorbachev delivered in 1983, two years before his selection as General Secretary.
The powerful upsurge in the antiwar movement, which has embraced the
entire globe, has become the sign of the times. Lenin's words serve as a warning:
"The war is terrible; it has hit the vast mass of the people the hardest of all . . . ."
The slogan "No to war!" is spreading throughout Lurope. and is echoed in the
United States and heard the world over.
The antiwar movement has become an influential factor in international life.
The ruling circles in the United States and the other NATO countries have to take
into account public protests against the arms race and against the deployment of
U.S. missiles in Western Europe. These protests reflect a new level of social con-
sciousness and activity of the masses.
Communists and social Democrats. Christians and Liberals, trade union,
religious, women's, youth, and other organizations approach the struggle for peace
from largely different political and ideological positions. But they have a common
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goal -- to prevent the catastrophe which the warmongers are preparing for mankind.
The conviction that this goal can be attained is growing ever stronger. War can and
must be prevented. (Emphasis added.) [Ref. 27: pp. 26-7]
Note the recurrence of the theme of Western responsibility for political and military
tensions -- that the "warmongers" are preparing a catastrophe for mankind. It is worthy
of note that Gorbachev spoke the words quoted above at a meeting in Moscow to mark
the 113th anniversary of Lenin's birth.
E. GORBACHEV AS A PEACE PROGRAMMER -- THEMES FROM
PERESTROIKA
This section examines key themes that emerge from General Secretary Gorbachev's
contemporary appeals. The main source of these appeals is his book, Perestroika . This
study organizes nineteen key themes into six groupings. These groupings are:
1. Communality
2. The nature of communism
3. New political thinking
4. Nuclear fear
5.- Old political thinking
6. Strength and resolve of the U.S.S.R.
These groupings are presented in the order listed, and observations drawn from individ-
ual themes are related to these questions:
• How does Gorbachev's appeal relate to Soviet long-term military and political
strategy?
• What is his intended message for the people of the U.S. and the Western alliance?
• Are there discernible messages that lie below the surface of his words?
Short citations from the book are provided as examples of these themes. This method
offers the reader a useful distillation of Gorbachev's appeal to the publics of the West.
1. Communality
This grouping of themes stresses that this is a small planet, and that several
factors (including environmental pollution, the threat of nuclear devastation and Third
World under-development and poverty) have made this modern age different from all
previous ages. Within this grouping there are three discrete themes. The first may be
stated as "Our problem is your problem." Gorbachev's "common European home" meta-
phor is perhaps the best example of this theme.
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This metaphor came to my mind in one of my discussions. Although seemingly I
voiced it in passing, in my mind I had been looking for such a formula for a long
time. It did not come to me all of a sudden but after much thought and. notably.
after meetings with many European leaders.
Having conditioned myself for a new political outlook. I could no longer
accept in the old way the multi-colored, patchwork-quik-like political map of
Europe. The continent has known more than its share of wars and tears. It has had
enough. Scanning the panorama of this long-suffering land and pondering on the
common roots of such a multi-form but essentially common European civilization.
I felt with growing acuteness the artificiality and temporanness of the bloc-to-bloc
confrontation and the archaic nature of the "iron curtain." That was probably how
the idea of a common European home came to my mind, and at the right moment
this expression sprang from my tongue by itself. [Ref. 1: p. 194J
This passage seems surreal in that it is detached from the history of the post- 1945 period
as it is commonly understood in the West. In Gorbachev's opening message to the
reader cited earlier, he says that, ". . . the purpose of this book is to talk without inter-
mediaries to the citizens of the whole world about things that, without exception concern
us all." [Ref. 1: p. 9] Perhaps communality will be the future face of communism.
The second theme of expressing communality might be called "spaceship earth."
In an obvious analogy drawn between Noah's flood and the threat of nuclear war.
Gorbachev says:
For all the contradictions of the present-day world, for all the diversity of social and
political systems in it, and for all the different choices made by the nations in dif-
ferent times, this world is nevertheless one whole. We are all passengers aboard one
ship, the Earth, and we must not allow it to be wrecked. There will be no second
Noah's ark. [Ref. 1: p. 12]
A second motivation for globalism is offered in environmental terms when he says,
Another no less obvious reality of our time is the emergence and aggravation of the
so-called global issues which have also become vital to the destinies of civilization.
I mean nature conservation, the critical condition of the environment, of the air
basin and the oceans, and of our planet's traditional resources which have turned
out not to be limitless. I mean old and new awful diseases and mankind's common
concern: how are we to put an end to starvation and poverty in vast areas of the
Earth? I mean the intelligent joint work in exploring outer space and the world
ocean and the use of the knowledge obtained to the benefit of humanitv,
[Ref. 1: p. 137]
By alluding to widespread fears of extermination and disease, to concern for the envi-
ronment and to love for our fellow man, General Secretary Gorbachev implores us to
think in global terms. This last quotation touches on the third and final theme in this
grouping, that of "Third World development." Many references to the Third World in the
book are accompanied by familiar Soviet language regarding the theoretical process of
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transition from decolonialization to maturity as a socialist state. The following appeal
for America to shift its resources from defense spending to foreign aid does not mention
that process.:
We call on the US Administration to join hands with us in searching for
solutions to the Third World's problems. There are other ways besides compulsion
to do it. What we propose is quite realistic. The United States should find a way
to divert its might, its capital -- everything that is now being squandered for military
purposes -- to meeting different needs, to solving the modern world's economic and
social problems. I'm positive that this is quite possible. More than that, the United
States could enlist the assistance of other Western countries. And I repeat that all
the while it would stand only to gain. [Ref. 1: p. 189]
As can be seen in these examples, Gorbachev is olfering a multi-faceted appeal for
America and the West to recognize that we have common problems, and that our des-
tinies are unalterably linked.
2. The Nature of Communism
The composite message of this grouping is that the West has misunderstood the
nature of communism and has misinterpreted the history of the Soviet rule in Russia.
This message is essentially one of historical revision. Individual themes within this cat-
egory will be treated chronologically. The first theme states that, "The firebrand image
of Lenin is incorrect." At one point in the book, Gorbachev takes aim at President
Reagan and his view of Lenin's legacy and says,
As for the mysterious White House book of quotations to which the West refers,
deliberating about Lenin's "doctrine" of imposing communism throughout the world
and plans for subduing the whole of Europe, I must say that no such doctrine was
ever entertained by Marx, Lenin or any of the Soviet leaders. The so-called "quo-
tations'' sometimes used by high-ranking speakers are the fruit of crude falsification
or at best ignorance. [Ref. I: p. 150]
Gorbachev includes a eulogy of Lenin earlier in the book, in a section entitled "Turning
to Lenin, an Ideological Source of Perestroika." This apotheosis of Lenin reads,
The works of Lenin and his ideals of socialism remained for us an inexhaustible
source of dialectical creative thought, theoretical wealth and political sagacity. His
very image is an undying example of lofty moral strength, all-round spiritual culture
and sellless devotion to the cause of the people and to socialism. Lenin lives on in
the minds and hearts of millions of people. Breaking down all the barriers erected
by scholastics and dogmatists, an interest in Lenin's legacy and a thirst to know him
more extensivelv in the original grew as nesative phenomena in societv accumulated.
[Ref. 1: p. 26]
This passage blends the earlier theme of attributing humanitarianism to Lenin and the
second theme of this grouping, that of Gorbachev's program for restructuring as a "re-
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turn to Leninism." It is not an overstatement to say that a cult of Lenin exists in the
Soviet Union, and that the high Soviet leaders are the most ardent devotees of that cult.
Gorbachev claims ideological orthodoxy for his reformation as he describes the genesis
of his "new political thinking" as a product of meditation on Lenin's visionary thought.
It can be said that we have conceived the new mentality through suffering. And
we draw inspiration from Lenin. Turning to him, and "reading" his works each time
in a new way. one is struck by his ability to get at the root of things, to see the most
intricate dialectics of world processes. Being the leader of the party of the
proletariat, and theoretically and politically substantiating the latter's revolutionary
tasks, Lenin could see further, he could go beyond their class-imposed limits. More
than once he spoke about the priority of interests common to all humanity over
class interests. It is only now that we have come to comprehend the entire depth
and significance of these ideas. It is they that are feeding our philosophy of inter-
national relations, and the new way of thinking. [Ref. 1: p. 145]
The next two themes involve the 20th and 27th Congresses of the CPSU. In
his interpretation of Khrushchev's speech at the landmark 20th Party Congress,
Gorbachev outlines its major accomplishments as: originating the modern usage of the
concept of peaceful coexistence, condemning the personality cult of Stalin and attempt-
ing economic reform [Ref. 1: p. 45]. Gorbachev apparently drew one important lesson
from Khrushchev's removal from power in 1964, in that the reforming First Secretary
of that day did not have the complete support of the CPSU apparatus, notably the
Central Committee Plenum. Gorbachev implies that he will not have this problem, as
he repeatedly states that the restructuring program has been worked out thoroughly with
this body [Ref. 1: pp. 60-74]. Concerning the linguistic revision of CPSU documents
by the 27th Congress, Gorbachev says,
At the 27th CPSU Congress we clearly "divorced" the revolution and war themes,
excluding from the new edition of the Party Program the following two phrases:
"Should the imperialist aggressors nevertheless venture to start a new world war. the
peoples will no longer tolerate a system which drags them into devastating wars.
They will sweep imperialism away and bury it." This provision admitting, in theory,
the possibility of a new world war was removed as not corresponding to the realities
of the nuclear era. [Ref. 1: p. 148]
Gorbachev implies here that the bellicosity of the CPSU has diminished due to a sober
assessment of the risks of nuclear war. Does a careful choice of words that are less in-
dicative of the USSR's readiness for combat make war less likely? Additionally, the line
of reasoning used in this passage raises a theoretical question: if a new world war is
impossible thanks to nuclear weapons, why does he wish to get rid of nuclear weapons?
Is it possible that the Soviets believe that nuclear weapons tend to stabilize the political
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status quo, in addition to making a world war highly unlikely, and that the Soviet in-
terest in political change causes them to favor policies of denuclearization? In any case.
Gorbachev offers the 27th Party Congress, his landmark congress, as further evidence
of a diminishing Soviet threat to Western security.
The fifth theme is a catch-all for miscellaneous revisions of the history of East-
West relations. These revisions, for lack of a more diplomatic term, are labeled "disin-
formation" . They include claims that:
1. The ruling national communist parties and the West were to blame for Soviet
interventions in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland [Ref. 1: p. 163].
2. The Afghans are using U.S. Stinger missiles against civilian aircraft [Ref. 1: p. 177].
3. Grain imported from the U.S. was needed bv the Soviets onlv as cattle fodder
[Ref. 1: p. 122].
4. There is not a trace of Soviet involvement in South Africa [Ref. 1: p. 176].
5. Khrushchev didn't really mean it when he said, "We will bury you!" [Ref. 1: p. 150]
This collection of revisionist themes has a single message. It says, "You have
nothing to fear from us!" It systematically counters indicators of threatening intent by
the Communists and replaces them with revised explanations.
3. New Political Thinking
This grouping can be seen as the very heart of the work. Roughly one third of
the book is devoted to these themes. The first of the six themes grouped here is the
phrase new political thinking itself. It is considered separately because Gorbachev uses
the phrase often enough to warrant tracking it and exploring it for meaning. Speaking
in the context of answering letters from fighters for peace worldwide, Gorbachev writes,
Such communication with people from all over the world reinforces my conviction
that the prospects for civilization are not hopeless, since the best minds and honest
people think and worry about its present and future, and are ready to devote their
talent, knowledge, time and emotional energy to preserving this world and building
a better and more just one. So. while basing our policy on new thinking, we do not
propose to confine ourselves to the ideas we are used to and to the political language
that is typically ours. We have no intention whatsoever of converting everyone to
Marxism. The new political thinking can. and must, imbibe the experience of all
peoples and ensure the mutual enrichment and confluence of various cultural tradi-
tions. [Ref. 1: p. 157]
While Gorbachev would probably prefer that Western audiences focus on the statement
"We have no intention of converting everyone to Marxism." this writer finds another
formulation more striking. What does he mean precisely when he says, "So, while basing
our policy on new thinking, we do not propose to confine ourselves to the ideas we are
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used to and to the political language that is typically ours"? A reasonable and amplified
paraphrase of that passage could read, "We will send new messages of calm and concil-
iation to the West using themes and symbols from the West's own cultural lexicon."
The remaining lour themes in this grouping present in detail what is new in the
new political thinking. First, it is presented as a "moral high frontier" . It strives to have
the advantage of moral ascendancy. This theme has a distinctly Western ring to it, and
is unusual in Soviet writing for at least two reasons. The first reason is that the term
moral in Soviet political and military writings often refers to motivational intangibles
and is roughly equivalent to the word "morale" in American English. A second reason
for saying it is unusual is that morality in the Western sense is not usually a factor in
Soviet political decisionmaking because the Soviets are generally understood to be
relativistic and materialistic pragmatists (in the Marxist senses of those words).
Gorbachev is plainly claiming the moral high ground for new-thinking communists when
he says.
No matter what the opponents of communism think, communism originated and
exists in the interests of man and his freedom, in order to defend his genuine rights,
and justice on earth. Communism has a tremendous potential for humanitarianism.
That is why our shared world outlook, and the ideas, assessments, considerations
and mutual benevolent criticism, which we exchange with our friends in spirit, are
indispensable. They help to develop a new way of thinking and to apply politically
the rich accumulation of international experience which reflects the interests and
sentiments of the working people. [Ref. 1: p. 155]
Secondly, "peace through disarmament" is a major, if not central, component of
new political thinking. Perestroika is replete with statements of this theme. One plea
for Western disarmament stands out from the rest, as it takes direct aim against any ef-
forts to redress Western strategic deficiencies.
In the West they talk about inequalities and imbalances. That's right, there are
imbalances and asymmetries in some kinds of armaments and armed forces on both
sides in Europe, caused by historical, geographical and other factors. We stand for
eliminating the inequality existing in some areas, but not through a build-up by
those who laa behind but through a reduction by those who are ahead.
[Ref. 1: p. 203]
Western experts on security affairs have pointed out that such statements are misleading,
because they usually portray the East-West conventional posture as one ol" overall
equality.
A third, closely related theme is peace through cooperation . The observation
has already been made that this approach is closely related to the CSCE experience in
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Soviet writings. Notably. Gorbachev draws an analogy between the CSCE and the
pan-Pacific conference he proposed in his July 1986 Vladivostok appeal.
There was much comment when it was suggested that there be in the foreseeable
future a Pacific conference attended by all countries gravitating towards the ocean.
This idea was put forward as a kind of working hypothesis, or. to be more precise,
as an invitation to discussion. The similarity to Helsinki is explained by the fact that
the world community does not yet have any other experience of this kind. It does
not mean, however, that the European "model" can be transplanted to Asia-Pacific
soil. But in our time anv international experiment has some general, global traits.
[Ref. 1: p. 183]
Finally, under the heading of new political thinking we find the theme of di-
rectly appealing to the people of the West. Gorbachev presents this theme as an imper-
ative of the informational age when he says,
I think the new style in international relations implies extending their framework far
beyond the limits of the diplomatic process proper. Parliaments, along with gov-
ernments, are becoming increasingly active participants in international contacts,
and this is an encouraging development. It points to a trend toward greater de-
mocracy in international relations. The wide-scale invasion of this domain by public
opinion, international and national public organizations is a sign of our times. Public,
citizen diplomacy, a way of addressing the peoples directly, is becoming a standard
means of interstate contact. (Emphasis added.) [Ref. 1: pp. 158-9]
Here Gorbachev implicitly denies that this appeal is propagandistic since it is a "sign of
our times" and "a standard means of interstate contact." Before new political thinking,
the Western publics would have been termed an ideologicalfront , and been subjected to
propaganda by the Soviet State organs. New political thinking, with its friendlier vo-
cabulary, has changed all that. Let us move from the components of new political
thinking to the stimulus that Gorbachev reports impelled him to think in a new way,
nuclear fear .
4. Nuclear Fear
This theme stands alone as a stark cornerstone around which the book is con-
structed. The following three paragraphs epitomize Gorbachev's numerous statements
about the frightening effects of nuclear weapons.
Last but not least, there is one more reality which we must recognize.
Having entered the nuclear age when the energy of the atom is used for military
purposes, mankind has lost its immortality. In the past, there were wars, frightful
wars which took millions upon millions of human lives, turned cities and villages
into ruins and ashes and destroyed entire nations and cultures. But the continuation
of humankind was not threatened. By contrast, now, if a nuclear war breaks out,
every living thing will be wiped off the face of the Earth.
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Even what is logically impossible, namely, that mankind can be annihilated
many times over, has now become technically possible. The existing nuclear arse-
nals are so great that for every inhabitant of the Earth there is a charge capable of
incinerating a huge area. Today, just one strategic submarine carries a destructive
potential equal to several Second World Wars. And there are dozens of such sub-
marines!
The arms race, just like nuclear war, is unwinnable. Continuing such a race
on the Earth, and extending it into space, would accelerate the accumulation and
modernization of nuclear weapons, the rate of which is already feverish. The world
situation can become such that it would no longer depend on politicians but would
become captive to chance. All of us face the need to learn to live at peace in this
world, to work out a new mode of thinking, for conditions today are quite different
from what they were even three or four decades ago. [Ref. 1: p. 13S]
Faced with such a future, does Western man have any recourse beside new political
thinking and accommodation with the Soviets?
5. Old Political Thinking
As if to answer the last question in the negative in most emphatic tones.
Gorbachev presents a cluster of three themes that can together be labeled "old political
thinking." and describes what he sees as an outmoded, dangerous alternative path to the
Soviet plan for eliminating nuclear weapons.
The first of the three themes in this cluster contends that alliances are part of
the old order and are dangerous. Regarding postwar Europe and the creation of NATO,
Gorbachev says.
Because of NATO. Europe once again found itself harnessed to a chariot
of war, this time one loaded with nuclear explosives. And today the main blame for
the continued division o[ Europe must be placed on those who have turned it into
an area of nuclear missile confrontation and are calling for a revision o^ the
European borders, ignoring politico-territorial realities.
For a start, we have repeatedly suggested scrapping the military blocs, or
at least the military wings o[ the two alliances. But since this proposition of ours
has not been accepted, we must take this reality into account as well. Even so. we
believe that, blocs or no blocs, we must still pave the way for a better world and for
improved international relations that would at some stage lead to all military alli-
ances being disbanded. [Ref. 1: p. 193]
Later in the same argument. Gorbachev says,
We resent the belief that Europe is doomed to confrontation between blocs and to
a continual preparation for war against each other. That the socialist countries have
not resigned themselves to that prospect is confirmed by the initiative, put forward
by them, that led all Europe, the US and Canada to Helsinki. The Final Act
adopted there showed real ways of attaining unity for the continent on peaceful and
equitable basis. [Ref. 1: p. 193]
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Here Gorbachev implicitly contrasts the "old political thinking" of the Western alliance
-- a policy that depends on the strength of arms for security with the "new political
thinking" he represents.
The second element of old political thinking is that of the inertia of the
military-industrial complex. Speaking about U.S. foreign policy after the 1985 Geneva
summit, Gorbachev lambasts President Reagan as an archetypical old political thinker
who is acting at the behest of the military-industrial complex:
But what about the United States? I cited the facts, and again the question arose
as to what the United States really wants if one is to judge by its real policies rather
than its statements. Not only did the Administration abandon detente, it seemed
scared by any manifestations of a thaw. I had to tell the Soviet people honestly
whose interests such policies were expected to promote. Indeed, it was not the
American people that wanted the military threat to increase -- was it? The US
military-industrial complex had to be spoken about which, like the ancient Moloch,
not only devours the immense resources of the Americans and other peoples, but
also devours the fruits of the efforts to eliminate the threat of nuclear war.
[Ref. 1: p. 233]
This quote contains a biblical allusion to Moloch, a brazen idol that was the object of
fiery infant sacrifices in the Hinnom valley outside ancient Jerusalem. Presumably
Gorbachev is arguing that the American military-industrial complex is actually
worshiping arms and sacrificing its children thereby while it claims to be deterring Soviet
aggression through the capability to exert armed force. Gorbachev's arguments in this
critique of old political thinking amount to "demonizing" his critics in the West.
When imagery, analogy, archetype and other rhetorical devices are inadequate
to drive a point home, Gorbachev is capable of literary streetfighting. This is the tactic
employed in Gorbachev's reaction to a French journalist's skepticism over his sincerity.
However, there are ideologists and politicians who continue to sow mistrust towards
the Soviet Union. The majority of West European countries, following in the wake
of the US. publish a great many hysterical articles, but. as always, the French
right-wing press is the most zealous. It is simply horrified by the very prospect of
a better situation in Europe. Take, for example, the French weekly L' Express. On
6 March 1987 it ascribed to us a desire to establish domination over Europe. An
article published under the glaring title "Gorbachev and Europe" is patterned after
Little Red Riding Hood and the Big Bad Wolf.
I thought: could European readers, European nations be so naive as to
believe such scribbling? We have faith in the common sense of the Europeans, and
we realize that sooner or later they will know the truth from lies. Judging by the
published results of public opinion polls, the majority of people in Western Europe
seem to appreciate the Soviet Union's open European policy aimed at putting an
end to the constant quarrels on that continent. [Ref. I: p. 198]
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Another example of his capacity for "literary streetfighting" is Gorbachev's reaction to
the free world's interpretation of his 19S6 Vladivostok, speech as potentially threatening
as "a 'caveman-like' response to our initiatives." [Ref 1: p. 181]
To summarize. Gorbachev portrays "old political thinking" as retrograde, dan-
gerous, and ignorant.
6. Strength and Resolve
The journey through Perestroika has been for the most part a bright highway
of peace, cooperation, and disarmament. In this theme o^ strength and resolve
,
Gorbachev has. in effect, hedged his bet by rattling the sword just in case the pen does
not convince the West to accept his oilers of a postnuclear world. If this interpretation
seems perhaps overstated or cynical, consider this warning to Secretary of State Shultz
regarding the Pershing IA missiles in West Germany:
I told the US Secretary7 of State: "Do you really think that we are so weak as to be
ready and willing to woo your Administration endlessly? Or maybe you think that
we are more interested in the development of Soviet-American relations and the
American side, consequently, has nothing to do for its part? If you do. that is an
illusion, an extremely dangerous illusion. I say this directly without any diplomatic
wrappings." (Ref. 1: p. 248]
This threat to the United States seems out of character for the architect of a new
peaceful world program. Under the banner of strength and resolve in another passage,
Gorbachev warns the West that the Soviet people are sufficiently hardened and resilient
to withstand any military challenge to their security.
I ask the reader to take a look at the experience of postwar decades. The Soviet
Union emerged from the Second World War in a very difficult condition. Yes, we
had won the struggle against fascism, won together with the US and other anti-
Hitler coalition participants. But whereas not a single enemy bomb was dropped
and not a single enemy shot was heard on the US mainland, a large part of the ter-
ritory of our country was an arena for the fiercest battles. Our losses — both human
and material - were enormous. Nevertheless, we succeeded in restoring what had
been destroyed, in building up our economic potential and in confidently tackling
our defensive tasks. Is this not a lesson for the future? [Ref. 1: p. 219]
Gorbachev lashed out at the "French right-wing press" in general for their old
political thinking, and at one French magazine in particular for likening him to a wolf
in sheep's clothing. In the first {"i\c groupings of themes, Gorbachev systematically
elaborated his claim to represent a collective of harmless and peaceful lambs. In this last
theme, however, he shows remarkably large canine teeth for that docile species.
46
F. CONCLUSIONS
To this writer, the current Soviet peace program championed by General Secretary
Gorbachev can be summarized as a multi-faceted call on the West to pursue negotiated
reductions in nuclear armaments and thus create a nuclear free world by the year 2000.
This appeal offers seven areas of motivation to the West for disarmament:
1. The assertion that nuclear weapons are a terrible evil in themselves and their very
existence is a threat.
2. The Soviet Union has abandoned its threatening position relative to the West due
in part to its need for internal economic rebuilding, and its recognition that nuclear
war is unthinkable.
3. The Third World cries out to be developed, and resources need to be diverted from
arms to aid.
4. Other problems need attention. Domestic challenges (in the West) need to be met.
5. The U.S. will sacrifice its high standard of living if it does not stop spending so
much on armaments.
6. The U.S.S.R. will not surrender its position of strategic strength relative to the U.S.
American nuclear arms and strategic defenses will be countered by Soviet strength.
General Secretary Gorbachev presents the threat of nuclear destruction as the cen-
tral and dominant reality of the age. By doing this he appears to be offering a selectively
edited reality for his readers in the West. The elimination of nuclear weapons is the
compelling imperative that springs from this reality. If, however, a larger, more inclusive
reality is operant, one that makes room for hegemonial intentions on the part of the
Soviets, the compelling imperative may be to maintain and even improve Western nu-
clear capabilities, offensive and defensive, and to foster a more informed public opinion
in the West.
Because much of Gorbachev's impact on the West has been enhanced by his per-
sonal charisma and force of personality, a few brief concluding comments on this unique
CPSU General Secretary are in order.
The popular impression that Gorbachev is a dynamic, new-thinking, brave
innovator do not seem justified when his "new political thinking" is examined in a fuller
organizational, strategic and historical context. The evidence reviewed in this chapter
demonstrates that his appeals are consistent with, and in some cases direct extensions
of, the policies of his predecessors in his current office. The content is not new, but the
packaging does give the appearance of novelty and innovation.
47
V. CONCLUSIONS
This section is devoted to summarizing the results of this examination of contem-
porary Soviet peace initiatives. The documentary evidence supporting these conclusions
will not be recapitulated so as to permit a concise resume of the findings.
Four broad conclusions have been drawn from this study: First, the current Soviet
"peace program" gives much evidence of consistency and continuity with earlier Soviet
initiatives of the Brezhnev period and before. Second, nothing in these policy statements
indicates that the U.S.S.R. has abandoned its desire for a worldwide victory of Soviet-
style "socialism." Third, the terminology used by the Soviets to describe the struggle
between the U.S.S.R. and those who resist the expansion of Soviet power has become
less belligerent over the years. Fourth, contemporary Soviet peace campaigns have been
directed against key defenses that have traditionally afforded protection to Western so-
cieties. Among these are:
1. OUR VOCABULARY -- The Soviets have claimed the linguistic high ground of
peace, progress, new thinking, cooperation, security and relaxation of tensions as
their unique domain.
2. OUR HUMANE VALUES -- In their treatment of the nuclear issue -- and more
generally — the Soviets have attempted to dramatically highlight the "inhumanity"
of armed resistance to their threats.
3. OUR GOVERNMENTAL PROCESSES - By trying to encourage pacifistic sen-
timents within elites, interest groups and politicians, the Soviets have attempted to
have an impact on our own policy making mechanisms.
4. OUR SUPRANATIONAL IMPULSES -- By drawing attention to the "overarch-
ing, shared goal" of avoiding mutual destruction by nuclear weapons, the Soviets
have sought to diminish the role of the nation as the traditional protector of its
citizens.
5. OUR MATERIALISM — Recent Soviet "pleas for peace" have consistently high-
lighted the claim that continued U.S. force modernization programs would cost the
U.S. its high standard of living.
6. OUR MISTRUST OF GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY - Gorbachev, in tak-
ing his appeals for "peace" and "new political thinking" directly to the people, has
capitalized on both the American tendency toward suspicion of governmental
sources of information and the openness of Western societies.
7. OUR DISDAIN OF ARMS - Gorbachev's appeals have capitalized on the re-
curring notion in certain Western traditions that the evil ol' war stems from the
arms that are used to fight wars.
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8. OUR FEAR OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- Soviet messages to the West have ac-
cented the horrific character of nuclear war. The message just below the surface
seems to read, "better to compromise with us than to prolong the risk of being
incinerated."
9. OUR VISION OF IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES DIVIDING DEMOC-
RACY AND COMMUNISM -- By highlighting unifying shared goals, the Soviets
have attempted to discount the fundamental political differences between the Soviet
bloc and the free world.
10. OUR PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET THREAT - By "putting on a
conciliatory face" the Soviets have attempted to defuse defensive instincts that have
motivated the West toward military preparedness in the past.
11. OUR RECORD OF THE HISTORY OF THE SOVIET PERIOD -- By a sys-
tematic process of revision the Soviets have attempted to alter our understanding
of historical reality.
It can be inferred from the above conclusions that future Soviet initiatives may
contain:
• Appeals that are gauged to have maximum impact by interacting synergistically
with Western value systems and perceptions.
• Approaches that follow the apparent Helsinki model of international fora that re-
sult in generalized agreements.
• Implicit and subtle assurances that Soviet proposals may be backed up by force of
Soviet arms, if they deem it necessary.
One final and nagging question remains. What will be the long-term Western re-
sponse to the new' type of long-term disarmament campaigns initiated by the Soviet
Union? The words of an ancient Westerner, the Roman poet Horace, shed some light
on the heritage of Western man resardin? the nobilitv of virtue undefended bv arms.
His ode Integer Vitae (Ode XXI 1)8 is offered here for reflection on that very large
question:
He who is upright, kind, and free from error.
Needs not the aid of arms of men to guard him;
Safely he moves, a child to guilty terrors,
Strong in his virtues.
What, tho' he journey o'er the burning desert.
Or climb alone the dreadful, dangerous mountains.
Or taste the waters of the famed Ilydaspes.
Gods will attend him.
8 Translated by W.N. Eayrs
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Place me where fate denies to man a dwelling,
Conscious of right, all other cares neglecting:
There could I live, thy charms and virtues telling,
Sweet smiling maiden.
If America were to lay aside its nuclear defenses as Gorbachev proposes, would
"uprightness, kindness, and freedom from error" protect it in the contingency of Soviet
aggression? Depending on the effectiveness of current Soviet initiatives. Gorbachev's
"new political thinking" may well need to be countered by "new political resolve" in the
West. This resolve would need to begin with a recognition that we are indeed at peril,
and that we dare not exchange our arms for an aegis of virtue that would make us de-
pendent on our foes' assurances that they are harmless and benevolent.
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